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THE WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER:
HEALTH EFFECTS AND COMPENSATION
MECHANISMS
John Howard, M.D., J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked and flew a Boeing
767-200 aircraft (American Airlines Flight 11) into the North
Tower of the World Trade Center (“WTC”) in downtown
Manhattan at 8:46 a.m. local time and a second Boeing 767-200
aircraft (United Airlines Flight 175) into the South Tower at 9:02
a.m. Within two hours, both of the twin towers (1 WTC and 2
WTC), and later 7 WTC, collapsed killing 2,752 people,1 including
343 firefighters from the Fire Department of New York City
(“FDNY”).2 Those who perished in the WTC disaster died from
consequences of major trauma, massive building collapse, lifeterminating burns, overwhelming smoke inhalation and falls from a
great height.
The WTC disaster triggered a massive emergency response

*Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and
Coordinator, World Trade Center Health Programs, United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. The findings and conclusions in
this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health or the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services.
1
Phil Hirschkorn, New York Reduces Death Toll by 40, CNN, Oct. 29,
2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/.
2
David J. Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in
Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED . 806, 809
(2002) [hereinafter Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness].
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involving thousands of early-arriving responders and volunteers—
both previously trained volunteers and “spontaneous” or
“unaffiliated” volunteers. Many of these responders escaped from,
or witnessed the collapse of, the WTC Twin Towers. Thousands
of later-arriving responders and volunteers engaged in search and
rescue activities to free those who were trapped in the rubble of the
collapsed towers. Over the ensuing days and months, many more
thousands of responders and volunteers from all over the United
States worked tirelessly in activities involving the recovery and
cleanup of the WTC site and the streets, residences and commercial
buildings in Lower Manhattan; the transport of debris to barge
stations located along the west side of Lower Manhattan; the
receipt and handling of debris at the Staten Island Landfill; and the
forensic examination of human remains at the New York City
(“NYC”) Medical Examiners Office.3 From the time of the collapse
until the last fire at the WTC site was extinguished on December
20, 2001, responders—and others in the nearby residential and
commercial building communities—were exposed to debris, dust
and smoke composed of several different types of hazardous
substances.4
During their heroic service in responding to the WTC disaster,
and during the years following the WTC disaster, some of those
involved in rescue, recovery and cleanup efforts, and some nearby
residents and other building occupants, including school children
and school staff, have developed new or worsened aerodigestive
and mental health-related illnesses.
This article provides a summary of the medical and legal issues
that the occurrence of adverse health effects following the WTC
disaster have generated. Part I of the article summarizes the nature
of WTC exposures and the populations exposed to debris, dust and
smoke from the WTC collapse. Part II of the article describes the
health effects seen in WTC responders (rescue, recovery and
cleanup workers and volunteers), residents, building occupants and

3

Philip Landrigan et al., Health and Environmental Consequences of the
World Trade Center Disaster, 112 ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. 731, 731, 733
(2004).
4
Id.
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passersby, students and school staff. Part III of the article
summarizes the mechanisms used to compensate the losses
sustained by individuals and businesses as a result of the WTC
disaster, including charitable giving, government aid, insurance
payments and tort awards.
I.

EXPOSURES

The combustion of 90,000 liters of jet fuel at high temperatures
led to the weakening of the WTC’s structural steel members and
within two hours resulted in their dramatic collapse.5 The collapse
of the towers pulverized the cement exterior of two of the largest
buildings in the United States as well as much of their interior
contents. 6 The energy of the collapse, together with the prevailing
winds from the west, immediately dispersed a dense plume of
debris, dust and smoke over a wide area of Lower Manhattan and
into western Brooklyn.7 After the collapse, debris from the twin
towers formed a six-story pile of rubble which was referred to as
Ground Zero or, simply, the Pile.8 Demolition and removal of
thousands of tons of debris began in October 2001 when the fires
at Ground Zero became less intense.9 Fires continued to smolder,
generating toxic combustion products, until December 20, 2001.10
Collapse of the WTC towers resulted in an intense, short-term
exposure to a rapidly dispersing plume consisting of both

5

Steven Ashley, When the Twin Towers Fell, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
ONLINE , Oct. 9, 2001, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000B7
FEB-A88C-1C75-9B81809EC588EF21&sc=I100322.
6
Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 731.
7
Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 734.
8
“ The ‘Pile’ was the name used by the site rescue, recovery and removal
workers to describe the colossal amount of debris after the attacks. The workers
avoided using the name ‘Ground Zero,’ which describes the location on the
ground where any explosion occurs, but it nonetheless became synonymous
with the World Trade Center site.” See Wikipedia.org, World Trade Center
Site, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center_site (last visited
November 8, 2007).
9
Id.
10
Id.
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particulate and gaseous contaminants affecting a large number of
people in Lower Manhattan and western Brooklyn.11 Within days,
both the composition and the intensity of this initial, short-term
exposure event changed into a more sustained contact, involving resuspended dust particles from rescue and recovery activities and
gases from the slow combustion of debris.12 These later exposure
events were of particular concern for all exposed persons, including
responders, residents, building occupants, students and school staff
living and working in proximity to Ground Zero. 13
WTC exposures can best be understood as a temporal sequence
of five exposure categories of varying intensity. 14 The first
exposure category occurred during the first 12 hours after the
collapse, during the most intense exposure to rescuers, residents,
commercial building occupants and people in transit and when they
were exposed to the highest concentration of large and small
particles and various gases.15 The second exposure category
occurred twelve hours after the collapse up to the first rain on
September 14, 2001 at which time WTC-affected groups were
exposed to large and small particles that were periodically resuspended, as well as to gases which were emitted from intense
fires at Ground Zero.16 The third exposure category consisted of
the time period from September 15, 2001 until the second rain on
September 25, 2001, when exposure to re-suspended particles and
gases lessened because of the rain but still continued at a lower
level of intensity. 17 The fourth exposure category encompassed the
11

Paul J. Lioy & Panos Georgopoulos, The Anatomy of the Exposures
That Occurred around the World Trade Center Site: 9/11 and Beyond, 1076
ANN . OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI . 54, 55 (2006).
12
Id. at 56–57.
13
Luz Claudio, Environmental Aftermath, 109 ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. 11,
A529–A536 (2001).
14
Paul J. Lioy et al., The World Trade Center Aftermath and Its Effects
on Health: Understanding and Learning through Human-Exposure Science, 40
ENVTL. SCI. & T ECH . 6876, 6878–85 (2006) [hereinafter Lioy et al., WTC
Aftermath and Its Effects on Health].
15
Id. at 6878–79.
16
Id. at 6879.
17
Id.
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time period from September 26, 2001 until the fires were
extinguished in late December 2001, when smoke continued to be
emitted from fires at Ground Zero but gradually lessened in
intensity, and when particle re-suspension occurred only in debris
removal and transport activities.18 The fifth exposure category is
the time period from September 11, 2001 to present, when settled
dust in indoor spaces can be disturbed by cleanup and building
demolition and reconstruction activities.19
During these five periods of exposure, WTC-affected
populations sustained varying, but largely unknown, levels of
exposure to a long list of toxic agents generated by the collapse of
the WTC.20 Among these were asbestos fibers (from insulation and
fireproofing materials); concrete and the crystalline silica it
contained (made from Portland cement and used in the Towers’
construction); carbon monoxide (from fires and engine exhaust);
diesel particulates (from vehicle engine exhaust); mercury (from
fluorescent lights); heavy metals such as aluminum, titanium,
chromium, zinc and manganese (from building materials and
furnishings); hydrogen sulfide (from sewers, decomposing human
remains and spoiled foodstuffs); inorganic acids; volatile and semivolatile organic compounds (“VOCs”); polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons (“PAHs”); polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”);
polychlorinated dioxins (“PCDDs”) and furans (“PCDFs”);
various pesticides; and other toxic agents. 21
A. Settled and Airborne Dust
Characterization of the settled and airborne dust generated by
the WTC collapse has been reported in several different studies
conducted by both public and private parties.22 Despite being quite
18

Id.
Id. at 6879.
20
K. McKinney et al., Occupational Exposures to Air Contaminants at the
World Trade Center Disaster Site—New York, September–October, 2001, 51
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY W KLY . R EP. 453, 453 (2002).
21
Id.
22
See, e.g., Claudio, supra note 13, at A528; Paul J. Lioy et al.,
Characterization of the Dust/Smoke Aerosol that Settled East of the World
19

H OW ARD F INAL FOR AUTHORIZATION 3. DOC

74

2/11/08 9:25 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

encyclopedic, many of these studies do not provide a quantitative
picture of individual or even group exposure levels because, on the
day of the disaster when the most concentrated exposures
occurred, no air-sampling monitors were operating close to the
WTC site “to characterize and quantify pollutants in the dust
cloud.”23 Some general estimates do exist. For instance, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency estimated that levels of airborne
dust around the WTC site immediately after the collapse ranged
from a level of 1,000 to greater than 100,000 micrograms per cubic
meter.24 Most studies note significant surface contamination; the
amount of dust particles that coated surfaces after the WTC
collapse ranged from 1-3 centimeters (“cm”) indoors to more than
10 cm outdoors.25
Most of the settled dust was composed of construction
materials such as pulverized cement, wallboard, office furnishings
and glass fibers.26 More than 95 percent by weight were composed
of large particles (particle diameters of greater than 10 µm and up
to 50 µm), but 1 to 4 percent of particles were small enough (less
Trade Center in Lower Manhattan after the Collapse of the WTC 11
September 2001, 110 ENVTL. H EALTH PERSP. 703 (2002) [hereinafter Lioy et
al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC]; Landrigan et al., supra
note 3, at 112; John K. McGee et al., Chemical Analysis of World Trade
Center Fine Particulate Matter for Use in Toxicologic Assessment, 111 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 972 (2003); Kenneth Wallingford & Erin Snyder, Occupational
Exposures During the World Trade Center Response, 17 T OXICOLOGY AND
INDUS. HEALTH 247 (2001); NAT ’ L CTR . FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEV ., EPA, Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of
Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster (External Review
Draft), EPA/600/P-2/002A (2002), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/CFM/
recordisplay.cfm?deid=54667 [hereinafter Exposure Evaluation].
23
Stephen H. Gavett, World Trade Center Fine Particulate Matter—
Chemistry and Toxic Respiratory Effects: An Overview, 111 ENVTL . HEALTH
PERSP. 971 (2003).
24
Exposure Evaluation, supra note 22, at 30.
25
Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note
22, at 712. Even though the measured levels of contamination appear small and
on the surfaces of objects only, such levels do, however, represent the potential
for significant respiratory exposure when such contamination is re-suspended by
prevailing winds or human activity. Id.
26
McGee et al., supra note 22, at 972.

H OW ARD F INAL FOR AUTHORIZATION 3. DOC

2/11/08 9:25 PM

WTC: HEALTH EFFECTS AND COMPENSATION

75

than or equal to 2.5 µm in diameter) to travel deep in the lungs,
where their deposition has been associated with adverse
cardiovascular and respiratory health effects.27 Exposure to these
harmful small particles was not constant as air concentrations at
several different locations in Manhattan show a series of peaks and
valleys during different times in September and October of 2001.28
These particles are usually deposited in the nasal passages, but
when exposures are intense—as in the first 12 hours of the WTC
disaster—or individuals engage in mouth breathing (as opposed to
nasal breathing), large particles can be deposited farther down the
respiratory tract.29
From the perspective of potential damage to the lung tissues, a
critical finding about particle composition and chemistry was that
both coarse and fine particles were found to be highly alkaline in
nature with a pH of greater than 7.0 to over 11.0—levels of
alkalinity that are corrosive to the cells lining the respiratory
tract.30
The published studies of settled and airborne dust also include
samples of specific toxins that are known to cause long-term health
effects, such as cancer and chronic scarring (or fibrosis) of the
lungs.31 Because cancer-causing asbestos was used as fire insulation
in the construction of the North Tower up to the 40th floor,32 it is
not surprising that samples of the material coating the collapsed
steel beams verified that the coating contained 20 percent by
27

Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note
22, at 707.
28
George Thurston et al., Identification and Characterization of World
Trade Center Fine Particulate Matter Air Pollution at a Site in Lower
Manhattan following September 11, 14 EPIDEMIOLOGY S87, S88 (2003).
29
Lioy et al., WTC Aftermath and Its Effects on Health, supra note 14, at
6880.
30
Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note
22, at 707.
31
W ILLIAM N. ROM & STEVEN MARKOWITZ , ENVIRONMENTAL AND
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE (Lippincott, Williams & Wilkin eds., 4th ed.
2006).
32
W.B. Reitze et al., Application of Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing
Asbestos: Occupational Health Hazards, 33 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’ N J.
178, 180 (1972).
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volume of chrysotile asbestos.33 Asbestos fibers were also found to
represent from 0.8 to 3.0 percent by weight of settled dust. 34
Despite being detected in settled dust, only 22 of several thousand
air samples taken during the earliest days after September 11, 2001,
revealed a concentration of asbestos fibers greater than the upper
limit of 70 fibers/square millimeter established in the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA).35 Particles of
crystalline silica were found in all but one of twenty-seven settled
dust samples taken with concentrations by weight ranging from 0
to 18 percent (median of 3.2 percent), but silica particles that could
be inhaled into the lungs were not detected in any of 18 air
samples.36
Undoubtedly, individual exposures to asbestos fibers,
crystalline silica, and other cancer-causing agents took place
following the WTC collapse, but it is very difficult to
quantitatively document such exposure retrospectively since
contemporaneous records of individual breathing zone exposures
were not made. Also, an estimated 100 to 1,000 tons of cancercausing PAHs were spread over a localized area of Lower
Manhattan.37 Air sampling for PAHs during the first two months
after September 11, 2001 revealed levels greater at Ground Zero
than in other areas of Manhattan, but those levels declined between
September 11 and December 20, 2001 as the fires subsided.38
Levels of PCBs, PCDDs and PCDFs were found in a detectable
33

ROGER N. CLARK ET AL ., ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF THE W ORLD
TRADE CENTER AREA AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACK, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN FILE REPORT OFR-01-0429 (2001), available at
http://geology.cr.usgs.gov/pub/open-file-reports/ofr-01-0429/.
34
Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note
22, at 707.
35
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Response to September
11, http://www.epa.gov/wtc/asbestos/ (last visited May 1, 2007).
36
K. McKinney et al., supra note 20, at 454.
37
J.H. Offenberg et al., Persistent Organic Pollutants in the Dust That
Settled across Lower Manhattan after September 11, 2001, 37 ENVTL. SCI . &
T ECH. 502, 507 (2003).
38
Joachim D. Pleil et al., Air Levels of Carcinogenic Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbons After the World Trade Center Disaster, 101 PRO. OF THE NAT ’ L
ACAD. OF SCI . 11685, 11686 (2004).
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range, but not at an excessive level.39
Finally, much more is known about the particulate—the solid
phase—component of the WTC exposure than is known about the
gaseous component, particularly during the first 12–24 hours of the
disaster when testing for gases was not conducted. Volatility and
lack of persistence in the environment prevented anyone from
characterizing exposures to inorganic and organic combustion
products that would have resulted from the intense temperatures,
vaporization of the thousands of liters of jet fuel, and large
amounts of polyvinyl carbon (plastic) inside the towers and which
were all gaseous components of the initial plume.40
B. Personal Sampling and Respirator Use
Significant efforts were made by numerous public and private
entities beginning from September 11, 2001 and into 2002 to
promote the use of respiratory protection equipment or respirators
by responders. The FDNY, the NYPD, the Port Authority, the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”),
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(“NIOSH”), the New York State Department of Labor (Division of
Safety and Health), WTC contractors and subcontractors, and
other parties provided respirator fit testing and actively encouraged
responders to wear their assigned respirators.41 However, the use
of respirators in the first weeks after September 11th has generally
been judged as less than optimal.42 For instance, the FDNY has
noted that the frequency of respirator use among firefighters
immediately after the attacks was in the 20 percent range but rose
to 60 percent after October 2001.43
39

Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note
22, at 712.
40
Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 731.
41
Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 732.
42
Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 732.
43
David Prezant, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Office of Medical Affairs,
Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) and Co-Director World Trade
Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program, Presentation at Fire
Department of New York City: Fire Department of New York City Rescue
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Sub-optimal use of respiratory protection equipment during the
initial stages of the rescue operation may have occurred for several
different reasons. 44 First, a supplied air respirator, like a selfcontained breathing apparatus (“SCBA”) which firefighters wear
for routine rescue activities, is designed to be worn for only short
periods of time, but the rescue efforts lasted much longer than any
previous rescue operation.45 Second, the weight and bulkiness of a
SCBA made work in the cramped debris spaces at Ground Zero
quite difficult.46 Third, the filters of non-SCBA type respirators
used during rescue and recovery at Ground Zero, like air purifying
respirators (“APRs”), quickly became clogged with dust after just a
few minutes in the highly dusty environment of Ground Zero,
making them impossible to breathe through.47 Fourth, APR filters
were not—at that time—interchangeable between respirators made
by different manufacturers, which created difficulties in replacing
clogged filters.48 Ensuring proper respirator use is a challenge
during large scale disasters and even when respirators are available,
their effectiveness may be less than optimal. For instance, a study
of respirator use in response to Hurricane Katrina also found suboptimal respirator use.49
There are only a few studies of personal breathing zone
sampling in responders and none of residents or other exposed
populations. In one study conducted from September 18 through
October 4, 2001, over 1,200 bulk and air samples were collected
and analyzed for asbestos, carbon monoxide, diesel exhaust,
hydrogen sulfide, inorganic acids, mercury and other metals, PAHs,
Workers, October 2001 to October 2002 (Dec. 18, 2006) (presentation on file
with the author).
44
BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., PROTECTING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS:
LESSON LEARNED FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS 22–24 (2002), available at
http://rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF176/.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Kristen J. Cummings et al., Respirator Donning in Post-hurricane New
Orleans, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 700 (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/5/06-1490.htm.
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respirable crystalline silica and VOCs.50 Exposures did not exceed
published NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limits (“RELs”) or
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits (“PELs”), except for one
worker overexposed to cadmium and another to carbon monoxide.51
However, widespread and continuous sampling of responders
working at Ground Zero, especially those actually working at the
center of the Pile, was not conducted.
Therefore, precise quantitative characterization of personal
exposures is not possible for individual members of WTC-exposed
populations based on the type of data collected at the time of the
event and immediately afterwards. However, more complete
exposure assessment is only available during controlled laboratory
experiments, or planned industrial operations, rather than during
real world catastrophes like the WTC disaster. Surrogates such as
time of arrival at the WTC site, time exposed to the plume,
distance from Ground Zero, and specification of activities involving
exposure to debris, dust, and smoke could be used as semiquantitative determinants of exposure.52 Future studies that aim to
determine causal inferences between WTC exposures and specific
health effects will undoubtedly have to use semi-quantitative, or
even qualitative, surrogates to create plausible exposure categories
that can clearly distinguish between varying levels of exposure
among an exposed population (i.e., low, moderate and high) and an
unexposed group.
C. Mental Health Exposures
In addition to exposures to the toxic substances described
above, those who witnessed the traumatic events associated with
the WTC disaster were exposed to a host of mental health
stressors.53 Exposures which may have caused mental stress

50
51
52

Wallingford & Snyder, supra note 22, at 249.
Wallingford & Snyder, supra note 22, at 250.
Lioy et al., WTC Aftermath and Its Effects on Health, supra note 14, at

6880.
53

Sandro Galea et al., Psychological Sequelae on the September 11
Terrorist Attacks in New York City, 346 N EW ENG . J. MED . 982 (2002).
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include seeing the hijacked aircraft fly into the WTC towers,
watching building occupants jump to their death from the upper
floors of the towers, seeing and hearing the towers collapse, helping
severely injured victims, and recovering human remains from the
rubble of Ground Zero.54
A study of mental health effects performed just two weeks
following the WTC attacks found that 22 percent of WTC
responders had acute post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).55
Studies conducted five and eight weeks after the WTC terrorist
attacks found that mental health stressors arising from the disaster
caused depression and PTSD in 7.5 percent and 9.7 percent of
Manhattan residents, respectively,56 and one study performed one
year following the attacks found that 13 percent of responders had
PTSD symptoms.57
Although it is important to determine for how long mental
health effects like PTSD persist after a traumatic event, there is a
dearth of knowledge concerning the persistence of post-disaster
PTSD.58 Nevertheless, information about the persistence of PTSD
in WTC responders is emerging. Interviews conducted two to three
years following the WTC attacks show that the overall prevalence
of PTSD among WTC responders was 12.4 percent, with the
greatest risk of developing PTSD found in those responders who
were not professional rescue personnel, e.g., construction and
sanitation workers and unaffiliated volunteers.59

54

Id.
Carol S. Fullerton et al., Perceived Safety in Disaster Workers
Following 9/11, 194 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 61, 63 (2006).
56
Galea, supra note 53, at 983.
57
R.P. Smith et al., Mental health status of World Trade Center rescue
and recovery workers and volunteers—New York City, July 2002–Aug 2004, 53
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY W KLY . R EP. 812–15 (2004).
58
Sandro Galea et al., The Epidemiology of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder after Disasters, 27 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 78, 85 (2005).
59
Megan A. Perrin et al., Differences in PTSD Prevalence and Associated
Risk Factors Among World Trade Center Disaster Rescue and Recovery
Workers, 164 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1385, 1385–94 (2007).
55
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D. Exposed Populations
Soon after the disaster, the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene began a registry of individuals at risk
for possible near and long term physical and mental health effects
from the disaster—the World Trade Center Health Registry (“the
Registry”).60
A registry is a traditional public health measure and its
purposes “can be summarized as collating information collected
from defined groups over time, which may be used in the
prevention or treatment of disease, the provision of after-care, the
monitoring of changing patterns of disease and medical care, and the
evaluation and planning of services.”61 The first step in establishing
a registry designed to keep track of those persons at risk of harm
from a disaster is to determine the number of persons exposed to
the event.62 In the case of the WTC disaster, the exact number of
people exposed to the debris, dust, and smoke from the WTC
disaster is unknown.
The most complete estimate of significantly exposed WTC
populations has been performed by the Registry in conjunction
with the Research Triangle Institute and the Federal Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.63 The Registry’s estimate of the
number of individuals in the various WTC-affected populations
was done to provide a denominator for its study of health effects in
WTC-exposed persons (i.e., the numerator for calculation of
incidence rates of new disease or mortality). 64
The Registry defined geographic areas of maximal exposure for
60

World Trade Center Health Registry, available at http://www.nyc.gov
/html/doh/html/wtc/index.html (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007). See discussion
infra Part II.E.
61
J.M. Weddell, Registers and Registries: A Review, 2 INT’ L J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 221, 226 (1973).
62
Id.
63
JOSEPH MURPHY , W ORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—
EXPLANATION AND CALCULATION OF OUTCOME RATES (2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-outcome-explanation.pdf.
64
Id.
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each of the major populations exposed to the WTC disaster, i.e.,
responders (rescue and recovery personnel, cleanup workers, and
volunteers), Lower Manhattan residents, building occupants and
people in transit, and Lower Manhattan school children and staff.
The Registry then estimated the number of persons in each major
population group by defined geographic area.65
For responders, the Registry defined the WTC site at which
they were exposed as a geographic area bounded by Chambers
Street on the North, Broadway on the East, Rector Street on the
South and the Hudson River on the West (and included the Staten
Island Landfill).66 For residents, building occupants and people in
transit, and school children and staff, the Registry used the
geographic area of Manhattan south of Chambers Street from the
East River to the Hudson River.67 Using these geographic
parameters, the Registry estimated a total population-denominator
of 526,269 exposed persons. 68
Within this total estimated population, the Registry defined
four major sub-groups: (1) rescue and recovery workers (91,469);
(2) residents living in the area of Lower Manhattan south of Canal
Street (57,511); (3) building occupants and those in transit
(62,092); and (4) students and school staff (K-12) present in the
area of Lower Manhattan south of Canal Street (15,197).69
The category of rescue and recovery workers includes people
who worked at least one shift between September 11, 2001 and
June 30, 2002 at the WTC site, on debris transport barges, or at the
Staten Island Landfill.70 The 91,469 estimated responders and
volunteers can be further divided into 8 categories: (1) 26,659
persons from NYC government agencies; (2) 26,480 persons from
volunteer organizations; (3) 20,397 persons from rescue/recovery
organizations; (4) 8,887 persons from New York State agencies; (5)
65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 15.
69
JOSEPH MURPHY , W ORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—
EXPLANATION AND CALCULATION OF OUTCOME RATES (2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-outcome-explanation.pdf.
70
Id. at 1.
66
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5,122 persons from federal agencies; (6) 3,499 persons from
Federal Emergency Management Administration (“FEMA”) urban
search and rescue teams and disaster medical assistance teams; (7)
400 persons from the New York-New Jersey Port Authority; and
(8) 15 non-overlapping labor union members.71
The lack of an exact list of WTC responders serves as one of
the most important lessons from the WTC disaster. It is vitally
important to keep accurate, contemporaneous records that identify
every individual who is a part of an emergency response effort.
Accurate and contemporaneous records of each responder enhance
the effectiveness of post-deployment physical and mental health
monitoring and treatment.
II. H EALTH EFFECTS
The WTC terrorist attacks created an unprecedented urban
environmental disaster and exposed emergency responders,
volunteers, nearby residents, office workers, students, school staff,
and others to a complex mix of chemical and physical hazards as
well as psychological traumatogens.
A. FDNY Responders
Nearly the entire FDNY workforce of 11,336 firefighters
participated in the WTC disaster response.72 Physicians from
FDNY were present at the WTC site immediately before and after
the collapse. 73 They saw first-hand the immediate health effects:
71

Joseph Murphy et al., Measuring and Maximizing Coverage in the
World Trade Center Health Registry, 26 STAT . IN MED . 1688 (2007), available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-article20070207.pdf;
MELISSA DOLAN ET AL ., W ORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY: W ORLD
TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—SAMPLING BUILDING AND DENOMINATOR
ESTIMATION (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/wtc/wtc-buildingdenominator.pdf.
72
Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, supra note 2, at
806.
73
Interview with David Prezant, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Office of
Medical Affairs, Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) and Co-
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orthopedic injuries from falling debris, eye and skin irritation, nasal
congestion, and difficulty breathing and coughing (dubbed “World
Trade Center Cough”).74
In the first 24 hours after the WTC attacks, 240 FDNY
personnel sought emergency medical treatment.75 Of these, 28 were
hospitalized and 50 received treatment for acute respiratory
symptoms caused by inhalation of airborne smoke and dust. 76
Several firefighters had respiratory problems that started within
hours of the disaster, and they were treated for serious, newly
onset lung diseases. 77 Others had respiratory symptoms that arose
weeks or months after their work at Ground Zero began.78 Due to
these early symptoms, FDNY quickly initiated medical screenings
of their members who responded to the WTC disaster and began
reporting their findings in the peer-reviewed medical literature.79
Three weeks following September 11th, FDNY initiated a study
examining 370 firefighters’ blood and urine (321 of these
firefighters having had direct exposure to the WTC site) to learn
whether any of their personnel had internally absorbed any of 110
potentially fire-related chemicals as a result of being exposed to the
WTC site.80 Values were generally low compared to reference
values, but “unanticipated increases in urinary antimony, serum
Director World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Programs, in
Brooklyn, N.Y. (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with David Prezant].
74
Id. World Trade Center cough was defined by FDNY Medical Bureau
“as a persistent cough that developed in a firefighter after exposure to the site
and that was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough for FDNY
physicians to place the worker on medical leave for at least four consecutive
weeks.” See Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, supra note 2,
at 806.
75
Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73.
76
Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73.
77
William Rom et al., Acute Eosinophilic Pneumonia in a New York City
Firefighter Exposed to World Trade Center Dust, 166 AM. J. OF
RESPIRIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED . 797, 799 (2002).
78
Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73.
79
Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73.
80
Philip Edelman et al., Biomonitoring of Chemical Exposures among
New York City Firefighters Responding to the World Trade Center Fire and
Collapse, 111 ENVTL. H EALTH PERSP. 1906, 1907 (2003).
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heptachlorobenzodioxin and serum heptachlororbenzofuran” were
seen. 81
Approximately one month following September 11, 2001, 332
firefighters in whom severe cough had developed were evaluated for
the presence of bronchial hyperreactivity. “[B]ronchial
hyperreactivity . . . was found in 23 percent of firefighters with a
high level of exposure (77 subjects) and in 8 percent of those with a
moderate level of exposure (26 subjects).”82
Also in October 2001, 362 firefighters underwent spirometric
lung function tests.83 The results of these tests were compared to
pre-WTC-exposure values obtained during their annual FDNY
physical examinations. 84 Reductions in lung functions were greater
than the expected annual reductions measured in a reference group
of FDNY firefighters prior to September 11, 2001.85 Additionally,
there was a 60 percent increased risk of a decline of greater than
450 milliliters in forced vital capacity in one second (FEV1) for
those personnel arriving at the WTC site during the first 48 hours
compared with a referent group.86
Ten months after September 11, 2001, FDNY did a study
comparing sputum87 in WTC-exposed firefighters with a control
group. 88 Findings from exposed firefighters showed an influx of
inflammatory cells that increased with exposure intensity and the
81
82

Id. at 1908–09.
Prezant et al., supra note 2, Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, at

809.
83

Debra M. Feldman et al., Symptoms, Respirator Use and Pulmonary
Function Changes Among New York City Firefighters Responding to the World
Trade Center Disaster, 125 CHEST 1256 (2004).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1260–61.
87
Sputum is a type of respiratory tract secretion which is distinguished
from saliva by the presence of bronchial epithelial cells and alveolar macrophages
(cells from deep within the lung). See DENNIS L. KASPER ET AL., H ARRISON ’S
MANUAL OF MEDICINE: A DISTILLATION OF CLINICAL MATERIAL FROM
HARRISON ’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 666 (16th ed. 2005).
88
Elizabeth M. Fireman et al., Induced Sputum Assessment in New York
City Firefighters Exposed to World Trade Center Dust, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1564, 1565 (2004).
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presence of debris, dust, and smoke products generated by the
WTC collapse.89 Based on these initial findings, and to better
define the respiratory consequences of WTC exposures, FDNY
analyzed longitudinal lung function from 1997 through 2002 in the
entire FDNY WTC medical screening cohort of 12,079
individuals.90 Results showed that WTC-exposed firefighters
experienced a substantial reduction (372 milliliters) in average FEV1
during a single year after September 11, 2001.91 The 372 milliliter
loss equaled 12 years of age-related decline and the loss in lung
function correlated linearly with exposure intensity as assessed by
initial arrival time.92
Recently, FDNY compared the incidence of firefighters who
had a “sarcoid-like” granulomatous pulmonary disease in the 15
years before September 11, 2001 with cases of the same condition
in the five years after September 11, 2001.93 In the five years
following September 11th, pathologic evidence consistent with new
onset sarcoid was noted in 26 firefighters (13 cases were noted in
the first year after September 11, 2001) for an incidence rate of 86
cases per 100,000 persons and 13 cases were identified in the
remaining four years for an incidence rate of 22 per 100,000
persons. 94 An incidence rate of only 15 cases per 100,000 persons
was noted during the 15 years prior to September 11, 2001.95
B. Non-Firefighter Responders and Volunteers
After receiving reports in late 2001 from physicians seeing
symptomatic WTC responders other than FDNY members, a
89

Id. at 1569.
Gisela I. Banauch et al., Pulmonary Function After Exposure to the
World Trade Center Collapse in the New York City Fire Department, 174 AM.
J. OF RESPIRIRATORY AND CRITICAL CARE MED . 312 (2006).
91
Id. at 315.
92
Id.
93
Gabriel Izbicki et al., World Trade Center “Sarcoid Like”
Granulomatous Pulmonary Disease in NYC Fire Department Rescue Workers,
131 CHEST 1414 (2007).
94
Id. at 1416.
95
Id.
90
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consortium of medical centers in the New York City-New Jersey
Metropolitan Area—the “Mt. Sinai Consortium”—received federal
funding to provide one-time medical screening for all non-firefighter
WTC rescue, recovery, site clean-up workers and volunteers, such
as police officers, private sector emergency medical services
workers, construction workers, site cleanup workers and others not
covered by the FDNY medical screening program.96
Preliminary reports of physical97 and mental98 health findings
were published in late 2004 on the first 1,000 responders screened
by the Mt. Sinai Consortium. These reports indicated a high
prevalence of physical and mental health problems in responders
and volunteers, including 60 percent with respiratory symptoms, 99
33 percent with abnormal lung function,100 and 20 percent with
PTSD.101
In September of 2006, the Mt. Sinai Consortium reported in
detail on the physical health effects experienced by medically
screened responders and volunteers.102 Of 9,442 responders and
96

Consortium members are Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, Queens
College, State University of New York (SUNY) at Stonybrook, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey/Robert Wood Johnson Medical School
and Bellevue Hospital/New York University School of Medicine. These
Consortium members provide: (1) periodic physical and mental health
assessment designed to identify short and longer term health effects that are
WTC-related; (2) clinical data collection, analysis and reporting to ensure that
all care provided is evidence-based; (3) scientifically-guided treatment for WTCrelated diseases; (4) translation services in over 20 languages; and (5) assistance
with filing workers’ compensation insurance claims, health insurance claims and
pension and disability claims.
97
Steven Levin et al., Physical Health Status of World Trade Center
Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers—New York City, July 2002–
August 2004, 53 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY W KLY . REP . 807 (2004).
98
R. P. Smith et al., Mental Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue
and Recovery Workers and Volunteers—New York City, July 2002–August
2004, 53 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY W KLY . R EP. 812 (2004).
99
Levin et al., supra note 97, at 809.
100
Levin et al., supra note 97, at 809.
101
Smith et al., supra note 98, at 813.
102
Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health
of Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program,
114 ENVTL. H EALTH PERSP. 1853 (2006).
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volunteers seen from 2002 through 2004, 69 percent reported new
or worsened respiratory symptoms while performing rescue,
recovery, and cleanup work, and 59 percent reported that the same
symptoms persisted until the time of examination one to three
years after exposure.103 Among those without any symptoms
before beginning their WTC response work, 61 percent developed
one or more respiratory symptoms while performing WTC
work.104
Most importantly, in addition to the subjective symptoms
reported during medical screening, the study also reported that 28
percent had objective measures of abnormal lung function.105
Among nonsmokers, 27 percent had abnormal lung function
compared to only 13 percent in the U.S. population as a whole.106
One measure of lung function in nonsmokers—the forced vital
capacity (“FVC”)—was reduced in screened responders. 107 Low
FVC was found in 20 percent of responders with abnormal lung
function compared to only 4 percent seen in the general U.S.
population.108 Both increased symptoms and abnormal lung
function were associated with early arrival at Ground Zero.109
Although there are several reasons unrelated to WTC dust
exposure explaining why a person’s FVC can be reduced, similar
lung function changes have also been reported by other researchers
in FDNY responders, thereby providing evidence of biologic
consistency in similarly exposed populations.110 Such consistency
in medical findings from studies involving different exposed
populations of responders contributes to the developing view that
WTC exposures are associated with serious, long-term lung
conditions.
103

Id. at 1855.
Id. at 1856.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health
of Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program,
114 ENVTL. H EALTH PERSP. 1853 (2006).
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., Banauch et al., supra note 90.
104
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Adding to the evidence for WTC-associated respiratory effects
in the responder populations is a study from the WTC Health
Registry 111 published in 2007.112 The study analyzed 2003-2004
interview data from the Registry for responders who did not have
asthma prior to September 11, 2001 and estimated the risk of
newly-diagnosed asthma and its association with WTC work
history, including use of a mask or a respirator.113 The study
indicated a relatively high rate of self-reported newly-diagnosed
asthma, i.e., 927 out of 25,748 responders, or 3.6 percent, reported
new asthma. Earlier arrival and longer duration of work at the WTC
site were significant risk factors.114
C. Responder Fatalities
In 2006, the death of police detective James Zadroga, Jr. with
lung fibrosis at a young age (34 years) was reported in the New
York City print media and received much attention from the WTC
responder community as well as the general public.115 After the
Zadroga death, the media reported several other responder deaths
from various types of lung diseases and cancers.116 A number of
these deaths included relatively young, previously healthy
individuals, thereby raising concerns that WTC exposures caused
their premature deaths. 117 However, from a scientific perspective,
it is not clear that the reported responders’ cancers and lung
111

See infra Part II.E.
Katherine Wheeler et al., Asthma Diagnosed after September 11, 2001
among Rescue and Recovery Workers: Findings from the World Trade Center
Registry, 115 ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. 1584 (2007), available at http://www.
ehponline.org/members/2007/10248/10248.pdf.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
9-11 In Fight of Their Lives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/04/16/2006-04-16_fight
_for_their_lives.html.
116
Death Sentence, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 24, 2006, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/07/24/2006-07-24_death_sentence.
html.
117
Id.
112
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diseases are causally related or just temporally related to WTC
exposures. Nevertheless, the similar pattern of conditions leading
to their deaths raises a suspicion that the WTC exposures that they
shared may have caused their deaths.
To further investigate responder fatalities, the New York State
Department of Health launched a WTC Fatality Investigation
Program in December of 2006 to find common patterns among all
responder and volunteer deaths. 118 A systematic surveillance
system approach is used to collect information on any person who
volunteered, worked, or responded at the WTC disaster site
(including Ground Zero and the surrounding area, on the debris
transport barges, or at the Staten Island Landfill) for at least one 8
hour shift between September 11, 2001 and June 30, 2002 and who
died after September 11, 2001.119 The Fatality Investigation
Program will provide information to improve the medical
community’s understanding of the deaths occurring in responders
and to improve the medical treatment of responders. 120
D. Residents, Commercial Building Occupants, People in
Transit, School Children, and Staff
Lower Manhattan is home to many thousands of residents.
People living in public housing, apartments, co-operatives and
condominiums near the WTC site experienced an acute and intense
indoor exposure to dust on September 11, 2001.121 For several
months afterwards, they experienced persistent exposure to dust
re-suspended by recovery operations and the activities of daily
living, as well as exposure to smoke from the fires at Ground
Zero.122 Dust and smoke gained entrance to residences through
118

New York State Department of Health, WTC Responders Fatality
Investigation Program, http://www.dos.state.ny.us/fire/WTCpercent20Info/
WTCRespondersFatalityInvestigationProgram.doc.pdf (last visited May 1,
2007). Cases can be reported to WTCFatality@health.state.ny.us or to (518)
402-7900 or (866) 807-2130.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531.
122
Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531.
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windows, building cracks, and ventilation systems. 123
Soon after September 11, 2001, researchers at Bellevue
Hospital, the New York University School of Medicine, and the
New York State Department of Health initiated surveys to
determine if there was an increase in the rate of new respiratory
symptoms in Lower Manhattan residents.124 Within 8 to 16
months after September 11, 2001, residents within one mile of
Ground Zero were surveyed about whether they had any new
onset respiratory symptoms.125 The analysis of nearly 3,000
residents of Lower Manhattan revealed that 55.8 percent
(compared to 20.1 percent among residents living five miles away
from Ground Zero in Manhattan) reported new onset respiratory
symptoms, such as cough, wheezing, or shortness of breath at any
time following September 11, 2001.126 These respiratory
symptoms resulted in an almost two-fold increase in unplanned
medical visits and use of asthma medication in persons living near
Ground Zero compared with others.127 The study also addressed
whether these symptoms were resolved right after the WTC
attacks or if they persisted by asking whether symptoms were still
present in the month immediately preceding completion of the
survey (8 to 16 months after September 11th) with a frequency of
at least twice per week.128 Newly onset lower respiratory
symptoms were present in 27 percent of exposed residents versus
8 percent of controls—a threefold increase in persistent respiratory
symptoms. 129
In addition to these early self-reports of symptoms in a non123

Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531.
Joan Reibman et al., The World Trade Center Residents’ Respiratory
Health Study: New-Onset Respiratory Symptoms and Pulmonary Function, 113
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 406 (2005); Shao Lin et al., Upper Respiratory
Symptoms and Other Health Effects Among Residents Living Near the World
Trade Center Site After September 11, 2001, 162 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
499 (2005).
125
Reibman et al., supra note 124, at 408.
126
Reibman et al., supra note 124, at 409, tbl. 2.
127
Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501.
128
Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501.
129
Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501.
124
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responder population, there is also clinical evidence of illness in
residents and others. The WTC Environmental Health Center at
Bellevue Hospital/New York University School of Medicine has
medically examined over 1,000 residents, commercial building
occupants, and cleanup workers.130 Although many of these
residents and workers were perfectly healthy before the WTC
exposure, the Bellevue Center has noted that many of the same
patients now manifest persistent, difficult-to-treat, respiratory
conditions, such as reactive airways disease and asthma, while
“others have a process in their lungs that we do not fully
understand and may consist of a granulomatous disease of the lung
like sarcoid, or fibrosis, which is scarring in the lungs.”131 These
survey and clinical findings in residents are remarkably consistent
with the findings seen in studies of firefighters and other rescue,
recovery, and cleanup responders.
E. World Trade Center Health Registry
The Registry is the largest effort in the United States to
monitor the physical and mental health of populations who were
affected by the WTC terrorist attacks. 132 Enrollment eligibility
includes: (1) people who were south of Chambers Street on
September 11, 2001 whether in a building, on the street, or on the
subway; (2) people involved in rescue, recovery, clean up, or other
activities at the WTC site and/or WTC Recovery Operations on
Staten Island any time between September 11, 2001 and June 30,

130

Interview with Joan Reibman, M.D., Medical Director, Bellevue/New
York University School of Medicine World Trade Center Health Center, New
York, N.Y. (February 4, 2007).
131
The Long-Term Health Impacts from September 11: A Review of
Treatment, Diagnosis and Monitoring Efforts, S. Health Educ. Labor and
Pensions (HELP), 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Joan Reibman, M.D.,
Bellevue Hospital and New York University School of Medicine), available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_21.html.
132
Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, World Trade Center Health Registry Surpasses 40,000 Enrollees; It is
Now the Largest Registry of Its Kind in U.S. History (June 17, 2004), available
at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/press_archive04/pr071-0617.shtml.
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2002; (3) students and staff enrolled in schools (pre-kindergarten to
12th grade) or day care centers south of Canal Street on September
11, 2001; and (4) people who were living south of Canal Street on
September 11, 2001.133 Estimates of the true eligible population
indicate that over 400,000 persons were eligible for a baseline
health survey questionnaire by the Registry. 134 The Registry was
able to recruit just over 70,000 participants before it closed to new
registrants in 2004.135
Like other registries examining risk, the Registry serves as a
scientific platform to explore evidence of excess mortality in
populations affected by the WTC disaster as well as the occurrence
of specific physical and mental health effects in WTC-affected
populations over time.136 The Registry also serves as an
information resource for all WTC-affected populations and
provides clinical guidelines for physicians treating individuals
exposed to the WTC disaster.137
The findings reported in early symptom surveys of Lower
Manhattan residents performed within 16 months of the WTC
attacks were corroborated by the initial WTC Health Registry’s
survey of nearly 9,000 survivors of collapsed or damaged buildings
done 24 to 36 months after the attacks.138 These baseline survey
findings, published in 2006, concluded that “two or three years
after September 11th, survivors of buildings that collapsed or that
were damaged as a result of the WTC attacks reported substantial
physical and mental health problems” and recommended that long

133

World Trade Center Health Registry, About the Registry,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/about.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2007).
134
Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688.
135
Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688.
136
Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688.
137
The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Clinical
Guidelines for Adults Exposed to the World Trade Center Disaster, 25 C ITY
HEALTH INFO. 47, 47 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/
downloads/pdf/chi/chi25-7.pdf.
138
Robert M. Brackbill et al., Surveillance for World Trade Center
Disaster Health Effects Among Survivors of Collapsed and Damaged
Buildings, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY W LKY . R EP. 1, 1 (2006).
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term follow-up of residents, building occupants, and others
enrolled in the Registry should be maintained, particularly those
persons most exposed to the dust cloud.139
In 2007, the Registry launched a second or follow up survey of
enrollees to determine whether respiratory and mental health
symptoms still persist five to six years following the WTC
collapse.140
F. Long Latency Health Effects
Several of the toxic substances that represent WTC exposures
are known to cause various types of cancer and lung scarring
conditions such as asbestosis. 141 For some types of cancer and
asbestosis, the time between exposure and the occurrence of
symptoms—the latency period—can be quite long. For instance,
the onset of mesothelioma—a type of lung cancer caused by
asbestos—can be 20 to 40 years following exposure.142 Given the
short length of time since the WTC disaster, traditional medical
theory would not predict the occurrence of most cancers in WTC
responders and other exposed populations during the early years
following exposure. Even though there are no scientific reports
affirmatively linking WTC exposures to cancer, a number of
responders have unsurprisingly developed cancer subsequent to
September 11, 2001. What is uncertain from a scientific
perspective is whether the association between the WTC exposure
and the subsequent occurrence of cancer is merely temporal or also
a causal relationship.
What also complicates the investigation into cancer as a causal
outcome of WTC exposures is that cancer is a relatively common
disease and cause of death in the United States; it has been the
second-leading cause of disease resulting in death since 1960.143
139

Id.
WTC Health Registry 2006–07 Follow-Up Survey, http://www.nyc.
gov/html/doh/html/wtc/survey.html (last visited on May 1, 2007).
141
Philip Landrigan, Health Consequences of the 11 September 2001
Attacks, 109 ENVTL . HEALTH PERSP. A514 (2001).
142
Id.
143
Infoplease.com, Deaths by Major Causes, 1960–2004, http://www.
140
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The same can be said for any subset of the American population.144
For instance, cancer occurs frequently among NYC residents, and
the average rate of cancer increases with age. 145 For males, the rate
increases fifteen-fold—from a rate of 96.3 cases per 100,000 New
York male residents aged 35 to 39 years—to a rate of 1500.1 cases
per 100,000 New York male residents aged 60-64 years.146 Most
responders at the time of the WTC disaster were probably more
than 35 years of age and most likely in the 35 to 64 age range.147
Using the Registry’s estimate of approximately 91,000 WTC
responders, several cases of cancer unrelated to WTC exposure
would be expected to develop in the responder population each
year.
The same picture can be seen with death or mortality from
cancer. For instance, among the leading causes of death in NYC
residents for age groups in which most WTC responders are likely
to fall—35 to 44 years, 45 to 54 years and 55 to 64 years—cancer
ranks as the number one cause of death in each of those age
groups. 148 Therefore, since cancer is not an unexpected disease in
responders age 35 to 65, its temporal occurrence subsequent to the
WTC disaster is not, by itself, an indication of a causal association
between WTC exposures and the development of that cancer. Also,
since cancer incidence and mortality both increase with age, it will
infoplease.com/ipa/A0005124.html (last visited Sept. 8,2007).
144
American Cancer Society, Statistics for 2006, http://www.cancer.org/
docroot/STT/stt_0_2006.asp?sitearea=STT&level=1 (last visited on Sept. 8,
2007).
145
N. Y. State Cancer Registry, N. Y. State Dep’t of Health, Table 6: Cancer
incidence and mortality by age group and region, 2000–2004, New York State
(2007),
available
at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/cancer/
registry/table6/tb6totalnyc.htm.
146
Id.
147
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, T ABLE A-27, PERSONS AT WORK IN
NONAGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES BY AGE, SEX , RACE, H ISPANIC OR LATINO
ETHNICITY , MARITAL STATUS AND USUAL FULL- OR PART-TIME STATUS (2007),
available at http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseea27.pdf.
148
BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, NEW YORK CITY DEP’ T OF HEALTH
AND MENTAL HYGIENE , S UMMARY OF VITAL S TATISTICS, 2005, THE C ITY OF
NEW YORK 13 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/vs/2005sum.pdf.
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not be unexpected, then, to observe increasing cancer occurrence
and death from cancer in the responder population as they age.
To distinguish between those cases that one would expect to
occur regardless of any WTC exposures from those cases that may
have occurred because of WTC exposures—determining on a
population basis whether there is an excess risk of developing
cancer in WTC-affected populations—is scientifically difficult and
resource intensive. In addition, there are ethical challenges to
making governmentally-provided medical treatment to WTC
responders or other affected populations contingent on proving a
positive association between WTC exposure and chronic health
effects by means of a multi-year longitudinal study. The 15 to 20
year time frame for prospective excess morbidity or mortality
studies raises the ethical issue that even if a causal association is
found, the findings may only benefit a small number of responders
who survive the time frame of the study. Like other long term
excess mortality studies, the real beneficiaries may be future
responders.
G. Funding for the Monitoring and Treatment of Health Effects
In 2002, Congress provided the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) with $12 million to
begin a medical screening program for responders and volunteers to
compliment the FDNY medical screening program which had been
funded by the American Red Cross.
In 2003, based on initial reports of a high prevalence of adverse
respiratory and mental health effects in responders from both
FDNY and the Mt. Sinai Consortium, Congress appropriated an
additional $90 million to establish five-year medical monitoring
programs at FDNY and at the Mt. Sinai Consortium which
provides for medical evaluation of enrolled responders and
volunteers every 18 months.149 In addition to providing funds for
medical monitoring of WTC responders in the 2003 Consolidated
149

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11, 517–518 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ007.108.pdf.
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Appropriations Resolution, Congress also provided $1 billion “to
establish a captive insurance fund . . . for claims arising from debris
removal, which may include claims made by city employees.”150
On August 8, 2007, a lawsuit was filed against the WTC Captive
Insurance Company, the Mayor of New York City, and members
of the Board of Directors of the WTC Captive Insurance Fund, by
three WTC responders.151 The plaintiffs allege that the Captive
Insurance Fund has failed to distribute funds for injured responders
and that the defendants have converted such funds for their own
benefit. 152
In 2006, Congress appropriated $75 million to add a treatment
arm to the monitoring program for those who are sick from WTCassociated conditions, as well as funding other support functions
for the Registry and the New York City police officers.153 In 2007,
Congress provided an additional $50 million for medical treatment
of responders and volunteers.154
In the 110th Congress, three bills have been introduced to
provide funding in the future to monitor and treat the physical and
mental health effects seen in WTC-affected populations. First,
Congressman Nadler and 31 co-sponsors introduced on February
28, 2007 H.R. 1247, the “9/11 Comprehensive Health Benefits Act
of 2007.”155 H.R. 1247 amends Title XVIII of the Social Security
150

Id.
Walcott v. WTC Captive Ins. Co., Inc., No. 1:2007cv07072 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/courtnysdce/case_no-1:2007cv07072//case_id-311197.
152
Press Release, Marc Jay Bern, Worby Groner & Napoli Bern, LLP,
Injured Ground Zero Workers Slam WTC Captive Ins. Co. & Mayor
Bloomberg Over Misuse of FEMA Funds (July 17, 2007), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20070718/18jul20072009.html.
153
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv’s, “HHS
Completes Allocation of $75 Million for World Trade Center Health Care,”
(October 27, 2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/
20061027.html.
154
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007)
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_
cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ028.110.pdf.
155
9/11 Comprehensive Health Benefits Act of 2007, H.R. 1247, 110th
151
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Act to provide “every 9/11 impacted individual” who has a 9/11
disaster-connected health condition benefits under the federal
Medicare program.156 H.R. 1247 proposes that medical coverage
eligibility would be based on “formal diagnosis of a qualified
medical practitioner or therapist and can reasonably be considered
in the judgment of such practitioner or therapist to be associated
with exposure to the 9/11 New York terrorist attacks.” Second, on
March 22, 2007, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney and
Congressman Vito Fossella introduced H.R. 1638, the “James
Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act.”157 H.R. 1638
authorizes an extension of funding for the existing medical
monitoring and treatment programs for responders at FDNY and
the Mt. Sinai Consortium and for “research on physical and mental
health conditions that may be related to the September 11th
terrorist attacks.” Additionally, it establishes a “9/11 Health
Emergency Coordinating Council”158 and re-opens the September
11 Victim’s Compensation Fund.”159
Third, Representatives Maloney, Nadler, and Fossella
announced on September 7, 2007 that they would introduce a new
bill called the Maloney-Nadler-Fossella 9/11 Health and
Compensation Act which would establish the WTC Health
Program, provide monitoring and treatment for WTC responders in
the New York City area and outside the area, as well as area
residents and other non-responders, provide for research into
conditions, extend support for the NYC Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, and reopen the September 11, 2001 Victim
Compensation Fund.160 On September 17, 2007, H.R. 3543 was
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1247.
156
Id.
157
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 1638,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1638.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Press Release, Reps. Maloney, Nadler & Fossella to Introduce
Bipartisan 9/11 Health and Compensation Act (Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://maloney.house.gov (follow “View All Press Releases” hyperlink at
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introduced by Representatives Maloney, Nadler, Fossella, and 46
co-sponsors as a new version of the James Zadroga 9/11 Health
and Compensation Act of 2007.161
On the fifth year commemoration of the WTC terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2006, New York City (“NYC”) announced
funding for WTC health care. NYC Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg
announced that the city would (1) establish an Environmental
Health Center at Bellevue Hospital to provide comprehensive
assessment and treatment services for those not eligible for federal
funding, (2) fund the Center with $16 million over 5 years, and (3)
provide the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene $21.6
million to expand the activities of its WTC Unit.162
The Mayor also directed NYC Deputy Mayors Linda Gibbs
and Edward Skyler to co-chair a panel of all NYC agencies that
serve or represent individuals affected by the WTC-related
illnesses. 163 The Mayor asked for the Panel to develop
recommendations to ensure those affected by WTC exposures
would receive appropriate health care and that all municipal
policies concerning WTC-related health issues would be wellcoordinated.164 The Mayor’s Panel issued its report and
recommendations to Mayor Bloomberg on February 13, 2007 and
the Mayor accepted the report and its recommendations in full.165
bottom).
161
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 3543,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/
D?c110:1:./temp/~c110MfyMvE::.
162
Press Release, Office of the Mayor, New York City, Mayor Bloomberg
Announces Comprehensive Citywide Effort to Address 9/11 World Trade Center
Health-Related Issues (Sept. 5, 2006), available athttp://www.nyc.gov (follow
“Office of the Mayor” hyperlink, then follow “News and Press Releases”
hyperlink, then follow “2006 Events” hyperlink, then follow “September 2006”
hyperlink).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Office of the Mayor, New York City, Mayor Bloomberg Accepts Panel
Recommendations to Expand Response to Health Impacts of Attacks on the
World Trade Center (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov (follow
“Office of the Mayor” hyperlink, then follow “News and Press Releases”
hyperlink, the follow “February 2007” hyperlink).
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The report acknowledged that many people continue to suffer
adverse health effects “that are or may be associated with WTC
exposure” and made 15 specific recommendations including two
that were directed at the federal government: (1) the City should
ensure that federal funding is available for treatment of “9/11related physical and mental health needs for all affected and
potentially affected populations;”166 and (2) Congress should reopen the September 11th Victim’s Compensation Fund.167
At the federal level, the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2008
federal budget allots $25 million for health care for first
responders.168 The amount proposed in the President’s proposed
budget is widely acknowledged as a “placeholder” figure and is
expected to be revised on the recommendation of the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as the FY 2008
budget is finalized in the Congress.169
166

LINDA GIBBS & EDWARD SKYLER: W ORLD TRADE CENTER PANEL ,
ADDRESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 9–11: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO
MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG 6 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/911_health_impacts_report.pdf.
167
Id.
168
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008—
APPENDIX , DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH
AND S OCIAL S ERVICES EMERGENCY F UND 435, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/hhs.pdf (last visited on
October 26, 2007). The President’s 2008 Budget for the United States
Government includes a provision in the Public Health Emergency and Social
Services Emergency Fund “[F]or expenses to provide screening and treatment
for first response emergency services personnel related to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, $25,000,000 shall be
available until expended.” Id.
169
Michael Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Secretary, at a meeting of the New York State U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives (Sept. 7, 2006) (noting that he was forming an HHS WTC
Task Force to make recommendations about how to provide ongoing health care
to responders whose health was adversely affected while conducting rescue,
recovery and clean-up activities at Ground Zero). For additional perspectives on
the Secretary’s Task Force, see generally 9/11 Health Effects: HHS’s
Monitoring and Treatment of Responders Before the Subcomm. on Gov.’t
Mgmt., Organd Procurement, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John
Agwunobi,
Assistant
Secretary
for
Health),
available
at
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III. COMPENSATION M ECHANISMS
The terrorist attacks in New York City, at the Pentagon in
Arlington, Virginia, and over the skies of Shanksville, Pennsylvania
resulted in an unprecedented loss of life, health, property, and
income for thousands of individuals and business. The attacks also
generated an equally unprecedented outpouring of effort to provide
compensation to those who were affected by the attacks. In 2004,
a study by the RAND Corporation (“RAND”)170 quantified total
compensation from all sources that was paid to individuals and
businesses as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.171 Approximately $38.1 billion in expenditures was captured
in the RAND study. 172 This amount can be divided into three
major categories: (1) $2.7 billion (7 percent) from charity; (2) $15.8
billion (42 percent) from government; and (3) $19.6 billion (51
percent) from insurance.173 Another major source of compensation
following accident events, tort awards, has not (as yet) been a

http://governmentmanagement.oversight.house.gov/documents/2007071111183
2.pdf; Hillary Clinton, Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on the
Progress Since 9/11: Protecting Public Health and Safety of the Responders and
Residents (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://clinton.senate.gov/
news/statements/details.cfm?id=262741; Press Release, Very First Federal
Dollars for 9/11 Health Treatment to be Distributed by October 1 (Sept. 7,
2006), available at http://maloney.house.gov (follow “View All Press
Releases” hyperlink at bottom, then select “Search Press Releases” for “2006”,
then follow “next” hyperlink ); http://www.hhs.gov/wtc/identify (last visited
July 27, 2007).
170
The RAND Corporation traces its origins back to World War II. In
1948, Project RAND (a contraction of the words “research” and “development”)
separated from the Douglas Aircraft Company, located in Santa Monica,
California, and incorporated as an independent, non-profit organization dedicated
“to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for
the public welfare and the security of the United States.” Rand.org, History and
Mission, http://www.rand.org/about/history (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007).
171
LLOYD D IXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR
LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS, at XVIII (2004), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG264/.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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major source of support for individuals or business.174
Seven major categories of individuals and business entities
received varying proportions of the $38.1 billion in total
compensation.175 Businesses received $23.3 billion (61 percent)
largely from property damage and business interruption insurance
policies.176 Civilians killed or seriously injured received $8.7 billion
(23 percent), chiefly from insurance and government with a small
portion coming from charitable giving.177 WTC responder-workers
killed or seriously injured received $1.9 billion (5 percent), chiefly
from government, but also a small contribution from charity. 178
Non-responder workers received $1.7 billion (4.5 percent) from
government and charity.179 Lower Manhattan residents received
$900 million (2.3 percent) from insurance and government with a
small contribution from charity. 180 People suffering environmental
exposures from debris, smoke and dust—residents and commercial
building occupants—received a total of $660 million (1.7 percent)
with the majority coming from government and small amounts from
insurance and charity. 181 Finally, the RAND study accounted for
$210 million (0.6 percent) received by those who suffered
emotional injuries.182
Contributions from charity, government and insurance
represent the traditional societal mechanisms that are in place to
provide compensation to those who suffer losses of life, health,

174

Id. The RAND Report states that “[A]s of this writing, no payments
have been made through the tort system. Some tort cases are being pursued, but
it will be some time before the tort cases that have been filed are settled.” Id.
See infra Part III.D.
175
Id. at xix.
176
Id. at xix.
177
LLOYD D IXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR
LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS XVIII (2004), available at http://www.rand.
org/pubs/monographs/MG264/.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at xxv.
182
Id. at xxvi.
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livelihood or business interests from any accidental event. 183 How
effective each of these mechanisms were in accomplishing their
compensation task—especially for those responders and others
whose health was not affected immediately after the event, but
much later in time—is still an open question.
A. Charitable Giving
Both personal and philanthropic charitable giving in response
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was significant by
historical standards. The most important conduit for private
donations was the American Red Cross (“ARC”). People across
the United States, and around the world, donated nearly $1.1
billion to the ARC. 184 The ARC used the donated money to
establish the September 11th Liberty Disaster Relief Fund (the
“Liberty Fund”).185
Using Liberty Fund resources, the ARC created the September
th
11 Recovery Program to offer recovery services to victims during
the three to five years following the WTC disaster.186 The Program
provided $282.2 million in living expenses for rescue workers,
residents and workers; $209.2 million in family gifts; $186.4
million for immediate and long term program costs; $167.9 million
in supplemental gifts; $71.2 million in funding for support
organizations; $14.7 million for mental health services; $12.2
million in health care expenses for victims; $11.8 million for special
circumstances gifts; and only utilized $66.4 million for fund
stewardship and anniversary travel.187 At the end of December
2005, the September 11th Recovery Program had $46.5 million in
donated funds remaining, which the ARC will use to support non-

183

LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON , W ORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW
660 (3rd ed. 2000).
184
ALAN GOODMAN , AMERICAN RED CROSS: SEPTEMBER 11 RECOVERY
PROGRAM AUGUST 2002–SEPTEMBER 2006 (2006), available at http://www.
redcross.org/images/pdfs/SRPReport.pdf.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
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profit agencies that can deliver services to WTC-affected groups. 188
To determine how the program performed to meet victims’
needs, the ARC commissioned an evaluation by the non-partisan
Urban Institute. The Urban Institute conducted extensive
interviews with hundreds of recipients of the Liberty Fund and
found that the quality of the ARC’s World Trade Center services
received high marks.189
As a mechanism of compensation from the WTC attacks,
charitable giving not only quickly provided services to those most
in need, it also filled an important gap in the social compensation
network for the WTC-affected populations. Charity was able to
provide services to those who were not eligible for government aid
or who did not have any insurance benefits, such as unauthorized
immigrant workers and others who did not qualify for government
aid or underinsured, small business owners. 190
B. Government Aid
Government at all levels—federal, state and municipal—sent
scores of personnel and resources to NYC in response to the
immediate needs of survivors of the WTC disaster. The Federal
Emergency Management Administration (“FEMA”), U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, and several other federal, state
and municipal government agencies, provided hundreds of millions
of dollars to care for emergency physical and mental health care
services, environmental assessment, and other support services
immediately after the towers collapsed.191 An important
governmental response effort in the area of WTC compensation
was a unique program called the September 11th Victims
188

Id.
ELAINE MORLEY ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICES PROVIDED
UNDER THE AMERICAN RED CROSS S EPTEMBER 11 RECOVERY GRANTS
PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411346.html.
190
Id.
191
For example, U.S Department of Health and Human Services’ funded
activities related to the WTC disaster totaled nearly one billion dollars,
available at http://www.hhs.gov/wtc/doing (last visited on September 8, 2007).
189
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Compensation Fund.
1.

The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund

In the midst of great concern about the economic viability of
the airline industry in the United States, Congress drafted, debated
and passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act of 2001 (the “Act”).192 The President signed it into law on
September 22, 2001.193 The Act accomplished three goals: (1) it
provided $15 billion in loan guarantees and cash to assist airlines in
meeting their direct and incremental losses from the terrorist
attacks; (2) it created an exclusive federal right of action for anyone
claiming to have been damaged as a result of the terrorist attacks in
one forum—the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York; and (3) it created the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund (“Fund”).194
The Fund was established to “provide compensation to any
individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) that was
physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”195 Using a no-fault
approach to compensation, like that found in state workers’
compensation statutes, Congress decided that those injured or
killed should be compensated without having to prove negligence
by any party. 196 Congress did, however, place several limitations
on eligibility to the Fund.197
First, upon submission of either a claim on their own behalf or
on behalf of another, the regulation required the claimants to waive
their right to file—or to be a party to—a civil action in federal or
state court for “damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-

192

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 1-601, 115 Stat. 230 (2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 403, 115 Stat. 230 (2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101).
196
Id.
197
Id.
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related airline crashes of September 11, 2001.”198 The Fund’s
requirement that a claimant waive his or her right to sue upon
submission of a claim in exchange for administrative relief under the
Fund is similar to the compulsory quid pro quo bargain between an
injured worker (who gives up his right to sue the employer for tort
damages) and his or her employer (who relieved of the risk of
having to pay tort damages agrees to provide compensation to the
injured employee) contained in New York State’s workers’
compensation statute and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 199
Second, an individual had to be physically present at the World
Trade Center, at the Pentagon, or at the site of the Shanksville,
Pennsylvania crashes “at the time of, or in the immediate aftermath
of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”200
The regulation further defined the term “immediate aftermath” as
“the period of time from the crashes until 12 hours after the
crashes” for all claimants other than rescue workers, and “the
period from the crashes until 96 hours after the crashes” for rescue
workers who assisted in efforts to search for and recover
victims.201
Many ill responders who engaged in rescue, recovery, and
cleanup work at the site did not arrive at the site until after 96
hours had elapsed, thereby rendering them ineligible for recovery
under the Fund. Even some of those ill responders present in the
198

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405 (c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 240 (2001).
199
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 204 (1917) (stating that
[I]t is plain that, on grounds of natural justice, it is not unreasonable for
the State, while relieving the employer from responsibility from
damages measured by common law standards and payable in cases
where he or those for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at
fault, to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and according
to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss
of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the
question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it
may chance to fall—that is, upon the injured employee or his
dependents).
200

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405 (c)(2)(A)(i), 115 Stat. 239 (2001).
201
28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b) (2002).
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first 96 hours did not become ill until after the December 22, 2003
deadline for submission of claims to the Fund had elapsed.202 The
immediate aftermath limitation on physical presence for rescue
workers, although longer in duration than that for non-rescue
worker claimants, together with the Fund’s short filing deadline,
has operated to deny Fund eligibility to many ill WTC responders.
As a result, both early-arriving and later-arriving responders are
now pursuing fault-based tort litigation actions.203
Interim final204 and final205 regulations governing administration
of the Fund provided a gender and race-neutral methodology to
calculate economic damage awards206 and stipulated a fixed figure
for non-economic (pain and suffering) damages.207 The collateral
source rule208 reduced an award from the Fund by the amount
received from insurance, pension and similar sources.209 However,
gifts from private charities (even if their original source was the
government) were not included in a collateral offset.210
The Fund was shutdown on June 15, 2004.211 At closure, the

202

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405 (a)(3), 115 Stat. 239 (2001); 28 C.F.R. § 104.62.
203
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520,
526–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
204
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; Interim Final
Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,273–66,291 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
205
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; Final Rule, 67
Fed. Reg. 49, 11,233–11,247 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
104).
206
See 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2007).
207
Non-economic damage awards were fixed at $250,000, “plus an
additional $100,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the decedent.” 28
C.F.R. § 104.44 (2007).
208
Collateral source rule is “the doctrine that if an injured party receives
compensation for the injuries from a source independent of the tortfeasor, the
payment should not be deducted from the damages that the tortfeasor must pay.
Insurance proceeds are the most common collateral source.” BLACK ’S LAW
DICTIONARY 219 (8th ed. 2004).
209
28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2007); 28 C.F.R. pt. 104.47 (2007).
210
28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2007).
211
Closing Statement from the Special Master, Mr. Kenneth R. Feinberg,
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Fund’s Special Master, Kenneth R. Fineberg, noted “over 7,300
claims for death or physical injury” were processed and “over 98
percent of eligible families who had lost a loved one voluntarily
decided to participate and submitted claims to the Fund” instead of
pursuing litigation.212 Although Mr. Fineberg characterized the
Fund as representing “the best in the American character” and
being “a tribute to the American people,”213 others expressed
concern about legal and policy issues raised by the Fund. 214
Specifically, concerns were expressed about the use of tax revenues
to compensate personal injuries that the government did not cause
and about making receipt of government aid contingent on the
person relinquishing their right to sue.215
It is uncertain whether the Fund is the appropriate model for
handling future personal injury claims arising from terrorist acts
occurring in the United States. As an administrative no-fault
alternative to tort, the Fund was viewed as an acceptable
alternative by Congress and most of its beneficiaries. 216
2.

Efforts to Re-Open September 11th Victim Compensation Fund

Several factors have prompted continuing discussion about “reopening” the Fund. Chief among these factors is an increasing
awareness of the number of responders who are experiencing later
onset mental and physical health effects following their WTC
on the Shutdown of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, U.S.
Department of Justice, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/closingstatement.pdf (last
visited on July 27, 2007).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Joan Bernott Maginnis, The Federalist Soc’y for Law and Pub. Policy
Studies, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Overview and Comment, T HE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY,
Mar. 27, 2002, at 2, http://www.fedsoc.org/
publications/PubID.136/pub_detail.asp.
215
Id.
216
James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund, Historical Antecedents and Lessons for Tort Reform (Jan. 13, 2005)
(Center for Legal Policy Working Paper), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.pdf.
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exposures and who are not eligible to apply for benefits from the
Fund.217 Nearly three years after closure of the Fund, Congress
introduced legislation to re-open the Fund.218 H.R. 1638, and its
successor legislation, H.R. 3543, would amend the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 to
allow a claim to be filed by an individual or a personal
representative on behalf of a deceased individual under two
exceptions.219
The first exception permits a claim to be filed during the 5-year
period after the date of enactment of the amendment if the Special
Master determines that an individual (1) did not know that he or
she had suffered physical harm as a result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 until after December 22,
2003, and before the date of enactment of the Act; (2) did not for
any reason know that he or she was eligible to file a claim until
after December 22, 2003; (3) suffered psychological harm as a
result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes; or (4) who is a
previous Fund claimant, suffered a significantly greater physical
harm than was known to the individual as of the date the claim was
filed, and did not know the full extent of the physical harm suffered
as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes until after the date
on which the claim was filed and before the date of enactment.220
The second exception permits a claim to be filed during the five
year period after the date that the individual: (1) first knew that he
217

Many responders did not become aware that the ill-health they were
experiencing was related to their WTC exposures until after the period of filing
under the Fund had closed. See LINDA G IBBS & EDWARD SKYLER, W ORLD
TRADE CTR. H EALTH PANEL , A DDRESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 9–11 (Feb.
13, 2007), available at http://home.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/911_health_impacts_
report.pdf.
218
Two bills have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
that address the same issue of re-opening the Fund. See H.R. 1638, 110th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill
=h110-1638; H.R. 3543, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/ ~c110MfyMvE::.
219
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 3543,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110gT2hvd::.
220
Id.
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or she had suffered physical or psychological harm, so long as the
Special Master determines that the individual did not know of such
harm until a date that is on or after the date of enactment, or (2) in
the case of an individual who had previously filed a claim and who
had suffered a significantly greater physical harm than was known
to the individual when the claim was filed, or had suffered
psychological harm, first knew of the full extent of the physical
and psychological harm suffered, so long as the Special Master
determines that the individual did not know the full extent of the
harm until a date that is on or after the date of enactment.221
Proposed Title III of H.R. 1638 would also amend Section
405(c)(2)(A)(i) of the Act to give the Special Master the power to
define the term “immediate aftermath.”222 The starting point for a
redefined “immediate aftermath” would be “any period of time
after the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001” to
that time the Special Master determines “was sufficiently close in
time to the crashes that there was a demonstrable risk to the
claimant of physical or psychological harm resulting from the
crashes, including the period of time during which rescue, recovery,
and cleanup activities relating to the crashes were conducted.”223 A
redefined “immediate aftermath,” so long as such a period of time
included the span of time during which all WTC recovery and
cleanup activities were completed, would make eligible the entire
estimated responder population of nearly 92,000 individuals.224
C. Insurance Payments
Insurance payments were a third mechanism of compensating
businesses and individuals for losses arising from the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. However, insurance payments were
not equally distributed; more than 85 percent of insurance
payments went to business enterprises under various policies such
as property casualty, business interruption, and event
221
222
223
224

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cancellation,225 leaving small businesses poorly compensated.226
Prior to September 11, 2001, businesses did not carry insurance
against terrorism-related losses, whereas many businesses now
carry such insurance through the federally sponsored Terrorism
Risk Insurance Program (“TRIA”).227 Individual insurance
beneficiaries received the remaining 15 percent of insurance
payments under individual life insurance policies, individual and
employer-based disability policies, and under employer-financed
workers’ compensation policies and pension plans.228
Insurance payments under workers’ compensation policies
have not been problematic for those workers who were killed or
injured as a result of the aircraft crashes on September 11, 2001.
However, for rescue, recovery, or cleanup workers who responded
as a job duty or as a volunteer, “state workers’ compensation
systems, designed to handle workplace injuries like broken arms,
are not well suited for determining an illness that may take months
or years to develop.”229
The issue may be both legal and perceptual. First, there are a
number of specific characteristics of New York State’s workers’
compensation laws that act as obstacles for WTC responder225

DIXON & STERN , supra note 171, at xx.
DIXON & STERN , supra note 171, at xxix.
227
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat.
2322 (2002). On November 26, 2002, President Bush signed into law the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”) to ensure that the U.S. economy could
recover from financial devastation caused by future terrorist attacks and which
was set to expire in December 31, 2005. On December 22, 2005, President
Bush signed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109144, 119 Stat. 2660 (2005), which extended the Program through December 31,
2007. TRIA requires the federal government to pay a share of compensation for
insured losses in accordance with Section 103(e) of the Act. The Extension Act
provided that no federal share would be paid unless the aggregate industry
insured losses from a certified act of terrorism after March 31, 2006 exceeded a
certain amount. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; TRIA Extension Act
Implementation, 71 Fed. Reg. 165, 50341-50347 (Aug. 25, 2006).
228
Id.
229
Anthony DePalma, Officials Slow to Hear Claims of 9/11 Illnesses,
N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/05/
nyregion/05health.html.
226
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claimants who are employees of NYC. Second, there is a view that
NYC, as a self-insured employer, tends to controvert claims from
its responder-employees to be consistent with its litigation
position in a tort suit for damages arising from WTC exposures
brought by some of those same responder-employees.230
Regardless of the legal and perceptual issues, it should not
come as a surprise that a compensation system crafted in the late
19th century in response to accidents of the early-to-mid Industrial
Revolution, and based squarely on the actuarial risk of foreseeable
industrial injuries, would have trouble responding to an
unprecedented workplace risk arising from terrorist attacks by
means of hijacked jet aircraft.
1.

Workers’ Compensation Insurance

In New York, the industrial accident crisis of the middle to late
19th century led to a number of responses: judges created a common
law of torts to deal with the onslaught of industrial accidents;
manufacturing workers chartered cooperative insurance societies to
protect themselves and their families from the ruin occasioned by
an industrial accident; and employers developed private
compensation plans.231 Ultimately, these efforts were not
successful, and advocates for a no-fault administrative
compensation system finally succeeded in New York State in 1910
when the legislature enacted compulsory accident-compensation
laws.232 The new law had an inauspicious start as the state’s
highest court struck it down eight months after its enactment as an
unconstitutional taking of employers’ property.233 A constitutional
230

Op-Ed., $400M For Lawyers? The Sick and Dying of 9–11 Deserve
Better, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2006, available at http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/03/2006-09-03_400m_for_lawyers_the_sick_
and_dying_of_9.html.
231
JOHN FABIAN W ITT , T HE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
W ORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE W IDOWS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
(Harvard University Press) (2004).
232
Workmen’s Compensation Law, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910
N.Y. Laws 1945.
233
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
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amendment nullified the decision and made New York a pioneer in
providing social insurance for workplace accidents. 234
The introduction of a workers’ compensation statute in New
York State “represented a striking new introduction of actuarial
categories and probabilistic principles into American law.”235 This
point is important when considering the performance of a workers’
compensation statute in an event as highly improbable or
actuarially remote as the WTC disaster. The early 20th century
design parameters for a workers’ compensation scheme did not
envision an event so thoroughly unforeseeable as the WTC
disaster.
Immediately after the WTC disaster, Congress provided the
New York State Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) $175
million for various purposes including $125 million for
administrative expenses, $25 million for the Uninsured Employers’
Fund and $25 million for volunteers for reimbursement of claims
related to “the first response emergency services personnel who
were injured, were disabled, or died due to the terrorist attacks.”236
A concern soon after the WTC disaster was that many
employers would be unable to cover the workers’ compensation
losses occasioned by the attacks.237 That assessment turned out to
be wrong; all employers with offices in the WTC towers with
injured, disabled, or deceased workers as a result of the WTC
disaster were able to cover their losses through existing policies.238
A group that did lack insured employers was the WTC volunteers
who had served as “first responder emergency services
personnel.”239 Congress had not provided eligibility criteria to the
Board for disbursement of the funds for emergency services
234

Witt, supra note 231, at 175.
Witt, supra note 231, at 175.
236
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act,
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, Ch. 115 Stat. 2230, 2312–13 (Jan. 10, 2002).
237
Interview with Richard Bell, former Acting Executive Director, New
York State Workers’ Compensation Board, in Albany, N.Y. (May 12, 2006)
[hereinafter Interview with Richard Bell].
238
Id.
239
Id.
235
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personnel and the New York Legislature also failed to enact
eligibility criteria for volunteers which would allow their claims to
be paid by the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (the “UEF”).240
Acting on its own, the Board provided their criteria for
accepting and adjudicating claims under the UEF, which included:
(1) serving without compensation or remuneration; and (2) serving
under the direction of an authorized rescue entity or volunteer
agency providing services such as firefighting, rescue, emergency
medical, health and sanitation services, emergency debris clearance,
care and shelter of those made homeless, distribution of food, water
and medical supplies, and other equipment.241 The second prong of
the eligibility criteria—the proof of presence requirement—proved
difficult for “spontaneous” or unaffiliated volunteers, i.e.,
volunteers not affiliated with an authorized rescue or volunteer
agency. 242
Employers who directed their employees to respond to the
WTC disaster are required under existing NYS Workers’
Compensation laws to provide compensation to those employees
who were injured as a result of those activities.243 Generally, injury
by accident is unexpected and occurs at a definite time, but if both
factors are absent, “one sees the typical occupational disease.”244
Occupational Disease. All states provide general compensation
coverage for occupational diseases usually by codifying a limited
list of diseases followed by a “catch-all” provision.245 New York
State defines an occupational disease as a “disease resulting from
the nature of employment and contracted therein”246 and provides a
list of 29 specific diseases with a catch-all provision.247 To be
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits based on an
occupational disease theory, the disease must be caused by the
240

Id.
Robert R. Snashall, Chair, New York State Workers’ Compensation
Board, Revised Order of the Chair, #967 (July 22, 2003).
242
Id.
243
N.Y. W ORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2007).
244
LARSON & LARSON , supra note 183, at 202.
245
LARSON & LARSON , supra note 183, at 202.
246
N.Y. W ORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(15) (McKinney 2007).
247
Id. at § 3(2).
241
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actual nature of the employment with reference to the processes by
which they are acquired.248 If the alleged disease is caused by a
condition in the environment of the workplace, it is not generally
compensable under New York law.249 Under the “nature of
employment” requirement for occupational disease claims,250 WTC
responders had no recourse other than to file under personal injury
by accident.
Personal Injury by Accident. Most cases of death or severe
injury arising from the trauma of the WTC collapse demonstrated a
prima facie case for personal injury by accident. However, when
the condition develops over time—as opposed to suddenly—
claims are more problematic under an injury by accident theory.
The New York Legislature has limited the definition of
“occupational disease” to diseases assignable to the specific nature
of employment. 251 In some cases, an occupational disease has been
filed as an accident and has been judicially determined252 to meet
the necessary standard as arising from “unusual environmental
conditions or events assignable to something extraordinary . . . .”253
In addition to a requirement to give the employer notice of the
injury or illness and to report any injury to the employer within
thirty days of the accident, there is a two year statute of
limitations on filing workers’ compensation claims.254 Many
248

LARSON & LARSON , supra note 183, at 229.
Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (N.Y. 1948)
(“An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply because it is
contracted on the employer’s premises. It must be one which is commonly
regarded as natural to, inhering in, an incident and concomitant of, the work in
question. There must be a recognizable link between the disease and some
distinctive feature of the claimant’s job, common to all jobs of that sort.”).
250
ROBERT R. SNASHALL , CHAIRMAN, N EW YORK STATE W ORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD , A STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN THE
W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM 13, available at http://www.wcb.state.ny.
us/content/main/TheBoard/odstudy.pdf (last visited on May 1, 2007).
251
N.Y. W ORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(15) (McKinney 2007).
252
Johannesen v. N.Y. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 84 N.Y.2d 129, 138–
39 (N.Y. 1994); Engler v. United Parcel Service, 16 A.D.3d 969, 970 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005).
253
Johannesen, 84 N.Y.2d at 138.
254
See N.Y. W ORKERS’ C OMP. LAW § 2(28) (McKinney 2007)
249
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responders did not become aware that the adverse health conditions
they were experiencing could be related to their work at the WTC
site until after the statutory time periods for filing workers’
compensation claims had elapsed.255 As a result, responders filing
workers’ compensation claims beyond September 11, 2003 were
barred by operation of law.
By 2006, the “controversion”256 of many responder claims led
to a public outcry to extend the two-year statute of limitations. 257
The NYS Legislature extended the two-year filing deadline to allow
claims for later-occurring conditions alleged to be causally related to
exposures while participating in rescue, recovery, and clean up
activities at the WTC to be recognized as occupational diseases and
for claim filing and notice provisions to begin to run from the date
of disablement rather than the date of exposure.258
The NYS Legislature did not enact an unlimited extension of
time to file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits related to
disease arising from WTC exposures. Instead the legislation made
the ability to file a claim in the future for later-occurring health

[T]he right to claim compensation under this chapter shall be
barred . . . unless within two years after the accident, or if death results
therefrom within two years after such death, a claim for compensation
shall be filed with the chairman, but the employer and insurance carrier
shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the
objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on
the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are
present.
255

Interview with Robert Snashall, former Executive Dir., N.Y. State
Workers’ Comp. Bd., in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Interview
with Robert Snashall].
256
Controversion means challenging the legal validity of a claim. See Your
Business and Worker’s Compensation, What to Do When An Accident
Happens, available at http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/Small_
Business/claimsprocess2.jsp (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007) (“The insurance
carrier can contest the claim for a variety of reasons, including that the injury
was not related to work, or the employee is not injured to the extent that he or
she is claiming.”).
257
Interview with Robert Snashall, supra note 255.
258
Act of Aug. 14, 2006, ch. 446, 2006 N.Y. Laws (adding a new article 8A to the Workers’ Comp. Laws of N.Y. State).
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effects contingent on “registering” with the Board before August
14, 2007:259
“[T]o register, those employees and volunteers who
participated in the World Trade Center rescue, recovery
and cleanup operations . . . must file with the Workers’
Compensation Board . . . a sworn statement, on Form
WTC-12, listing the dates and locations of their
participation in the rescue, recovery and cleanup
efforts.”260
Filing the registration form does not constitute filing a claim, but it
will give the Board some basis on which to predict future costs.
Recently, the NYS Legislature extended the deadline for
“registering” to August 14, 2008.261
In 2006, Congress rescinded $125 million of the Board’s
original 2002 appropriation,262 but then reappropriated $50 million
to the Board to pay Uninsured Employers’ Fund263 (“UEF”)
claims filed by “first response emergency services personnel.”264 In

259

Id. at § 162.
Donna Ferrara, Extension of Filing Time in World Trade Center
Rescue, Recovery and Cleanup Cases (Aug. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/SubjectNos/sn046_159.htm.
261
Press Release, N.Y. State Workers’ Compensation Board, Deadline
Extended for World Trade Center Responders and Volunteers to Register for
Workers’ Compensation Benefits (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.wcb.
state.ny.us/content/main/PressRe/2007/DeadlineExtforWTCResponders.jsp.
262
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-149, 119 Stat. 2833,
2834 (2006).
263
LARSON & LARSON , supra note 183, at 572
The most satisfactory solution to the uninsured employer problem is to
provide an uninsured employer fund, as is done in a substantial and
steadily growing number of states. The fund pays compensation to the
employee of the uninsured employer, then turns upon the employer and
calls it to account, armed with a battery of penalties, sometimes
including fines and imprisonment, which cannot fail to impress the
most elusive and irresponsible of employers.
260

264

Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexicoand Pandemic Influenza Act, Pub. L.
No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2814 (2006).
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light of the new legislation adding Article 8-A to the Workers
Compensation Law, the Board determined that if such a claim by a
WTC responder was challenged by the employer or the carrier, the
UEF would be responsible for payment of medical benefits
pending final adjudication of whether the individual was an
employee or a volunteer.265 If a final determination finds that the
individual was an employee, then the employer would be required
to reimburse the UEF.266 The Board made it clear that its Order
was not to be construed as extending the liability and/or
responsibility of the UEF beyond the available funds appropriated
by Congress in 2006.267 It is most likely that medical payments
will be paid only until the federal monies are exhausted; it is
uncertain what funding mechanism would continue to pay medical
benefits for those successful UEF claimants who need care. 268
It is important to note that meeting a registration deadline is
only one hurdle to WTC claimants. For those who register before
the August 2008 deadline and subsequently develop an illness and
make a claim based on their registration eligibility, medical evidence
that their claimed conditions arose from their WTC work will still
be required—no disease causation presumption has been built into
the workers’ compensation laws of NYS as of yet.269

265

DONNA FERRARA, NEW YORK STATE W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD, EXTENSION OF FILING T IME IN W ORLD TRADE CENTER RESCUE ,
RECOVERY AND CLEAN UP CASES (2006).
266
Interview with Cheryl M. Wood, former Chief Counsel, State of New
York Workers’ Compensation Board, in Albany, N.Y. (May 12, 2006).
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
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D. Tort Awards
By 2003, Congress was concerned enough with the possibility
of tort suits brought by responders for damages to health to
provide “up to $1 billion to establish a captive insurance company
or other appropriate insurance mechanism for claims arising from
debris removal, which may include claims made by city
employees.”270 Congress also imposed liability protections for the
airline industry and created a government financed September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund.271
Most survivors of those killed in the attacks and those who
were acutely injured opted to receive compensation through the
Fund rather than file a tort claim.272 Responders and residents,
however, have filed at least three notable tort suits against
government and private sector entities for longer-term damages to
their health arising from the WTC disaster response.273
1. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation274
Rescue, recovery and cleanup workers who experienced adverse
physical and mental health effects were largely excluded from
seeking compensation from the Fund because of the short filing
270

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11, 517–18 (2003).
271
Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REV . 1265, 1287–88 (2003).
272
Ninety-eight percent of those who lost a loved one filed with the Fund
and the Fund received 4,400 personal injury claims for which they issued 2,682
awards. Awards ranged from a low of $500 to a high of over $8.6 million after
offsets. Compensation for Personal Injury Victims, Award Payment Statistics,
th
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/
victimcompensation/payments_injury.html (last visited on September 8, 2007).
273
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526–
30 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04 Civ. 1888(DAB), 2006
WL 3771014 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006); Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73
(2d Cir. 2007).
274
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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deadline compared to the onset of ill effects after their WTC
exposures. This was so because the filing deadline occurred prior to
responders making a connection between adverse health effects
they experienced and their activities at the WTC.275
Nearly 10,000 of these WTC responders, volunteers, and their
survivors, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (or their claims were consolidated
there) for damages to their life and health.276 Plaintiffs sued a
number of different defendants, including: (1) the City of New
York (which coordinated all the work of the WTC site through the
City’s Department of Design and Construction); (2) the Port
Authority of the States of New York and New Jersey (the owner
of the WTC site); (3) four of the city’s major contractors (Bovis
Lend Lease, AMEC Construction Management, Tully
Construction Company, and Turner Construction Company) and
their many subcontractors who undertook the recovery work; and
(4) various entities with a property interest in buildings at, and
around, the WTC site, including Verizon Communications,
Consolidated Edison (“Con Ed”), the Silverstein Entities and the
Westfield Entities. 277
Plaintiffs claimed that NYC, its contractors, and other
defendants were negligent in monitoring the air and assuring proper
safety at Ground Zero, especially in failing to provide appropriate
respiratory protection equipment and ensuring its proper use. 278
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims based on
both state and federal laws providing immunity for actions taken in
response to the WTC disaster, including the New York State
Defense Emergency Act, 279 the New York Disaster Act,280 the
275

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001), provides in § 408(b)(3) that “The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting
from or relating to the terrorist-related crashes of September 11, 2001.”
277
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 525–26.
278
Id. at 523.
279
N.Y. U NCONSOL . LAW SDEA § 9102-a (McKinney 2006).
276
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Stafford Act, 281 and common law and derivative federal
immunities.282
On October 17, 2006, the court issued an Order both denying
in part and granting in part the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. 283 The court carefully considered all state and federal
laws that the governmental and non-governmental defendants
claimed granted them immunity from liability, including the
plaintiffs’ claim that the legislative purpose behind the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 was
to preempt state and federal law providing immunity to NYC, its
contractors, and other defendants. 284 The court considered the basis
of immunity separately.285
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act. The
court declined to extend federal preemption under the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 “to
preclude application of otherwise available state law immunity
defenses” and declined to bar federal immunity doctrines “as
contradictory to the alleged compensatory purpose of the Act.”286
New York State Defense Emergency Act. In the case of the
immunity available under the New York State Defense Emergency
Act, the court found that determining “whether the emergency
lasted for days, or weeks, or months, and in connection with which
precise activities, are fact-intensive questions, not possible to
answer in connection with a Rule 12 motion addressed to the
pleadings.”287
New York Disaster Act. The court declined to grant immunity
to the City under the New York Disaster Act because “the
Disaster’s Act’s grant of immunity is limited to actions that are
emergent in their own quality, and not only because those actions

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 20-19-g (McKinney 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006).
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 547–62.
See Id.
Id. at 543–46.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 554.
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were intended to alleviate a previous emergency condition[.]”288
The court also refused to grant immunity altogether to private
contractors because the Disaster Act “expressly limits its grant of
immunity to actions taken by political subdivisions and their
employees and officers.”289
New York State Common Law Immunity. The court considered
the governmental defendants’ (and Con Edison’s) claim that
performance of uniquely governmental functions after the WTC
attacks provided them with sovereign immunity but decided that
“[t]he issue cannot be decided in the context of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. It requires a proper, and fully
developed, factual record.”290
Derivative Federal Immunity. Defendants argued that the active
participation of federal agencies in developing protocols for health
and safety at the WTC site is enough to provide them with
derivative federal immunity. 291 The court agreed that if the
defendants acted according to specific instructions from a federal
agency and under the control and direction of the federal agency,
derivative immunity may be available; however, it would not exist
where the defendants “act[ed] independently, or outside of, or in
addition to, the government’s specifications.”292 The court found,
though, that the record presented did not allow it “to demark the
boundary between federally instructed discretionary decisions, and
those made by the various Defendants” and denied the motion for
summary judgment based on derivative federal immunity. 293
Stafford Act Immunity. Various defendants asserted immunity
pursuant to the Stafford Act,294 but the court declined to extend
immunity under the Act to non-federal parties because “to do so
would extend the Act beyond its plain terms.”295 In reminding the
288

See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520,
558 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
289
Id.
290
Id. at 559.
291
Id. at 560.
292
Id. at 566.
293
Id.
294
42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006).
295
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 558
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parties that immunity is to be interpreted narrowly, the court
commented on the defendants’ argument that private parties should
be encouraged by courts to enlist in recovery efforts from mass
disasters.296 The court stated that “the same policy has to be
sensitive to the individual workers who risk their lives.”297 The
court also explained that “the job of restoring society cannot be
based on a system rewarding businesses, but being indifferent to
the health and welfare of working people.”298
Other Bases for Federal Immunity. The Port Authority and
WTC Lessee defendants (Con Edison and Silverstein) argued that
“the federal government’s promise to pay . . . all the costs
associated with rescue and recovery . . . makes the federal
government the real party in interest” and therefore, plaintiffs’
actions against them should be dismissed.299 The court noted that
indemnification may be sought by the defendants from the federal
government, but that “such promise of payment, however, does
not operate to suspend ordinary rules of rights and obligations
running between a tortfeasor and his alleged victim.”300
The court did, however, grant Con Edison’s and WTC
defendants’ motions based on the fact that they “were immediately
divested of control over their leasehold interests and were entirely
denied access to their properties absent express authorization by
the City and Port Authority.”301 The court denied the motions to
dismiss made by the Port Authority, NYC, and its contractors,
concluding that “the state and federal statutes that provide
immunity protect the remaining defendants against suit, but the
precise scope and extent of the immunity varies according to date,
place and activity [and] . . . the fact-intensive nature of the issue

(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
296
Id. at 41.
297
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id. (noting Defendants’ reliance on Proclamation 7463—Declaration of
National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Acts, September 14, 2001.
66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (September 18, 2001)).
300
Id.
301
Id. at 96.
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makes its resolution unsuitable for resolution by motion.”302
2. Benzman v. Whitman303
In 2004, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York by representatives of a class
composed of (1) residents of Lower Manhattan (including
Chinatown and the Lower East Side) and Brooklyn; (2) students
attending schools in Lower Manhattan or Brooklyn; and (3)
workers from places of employment in Lower Manhattan and
Brooklyn, who were exposed to hazardous substances in the
interior of their residences, schools, and workplaces as a result of
the dust released from the WTC collapse. 304 The lawsuit named the
former and current Administrators of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), as well as the former
Assistant EPA Administrator, as defendants. 305
Plaintiffs alleged four counts against the defendants. 306 In
Count One, the plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation against
individual defendants, Christine Todd Whitman, the former EPA
Administrator and Marianne Horinko, the former Assistant
Administrator.307 Under Count One, the plaintiffs sought
compensatory damages, reimbursement of costs, and the creation
of a fund to finance a medical monitoring.308
In Count Two, plaintiffs alleged that the EPA violated the
Administrative Procedures Act—specifically six regulatory
302

Id.
First Amended Class Action Complaint, Benzman v. Whitman, No.
04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 250527 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006).
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id. See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO . L. R EV . 349, 361–62 (2005) (noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court and a number of state supreme courts have refused to
recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action absent present physical injury,
while 11 states plus the District of Columbia allow medical monitoring claim to
be made without a showing of present physical injury).
303

H OW ARD F INAL FOR AUTHORIZATION 3. DOC

2/11/08 9:25 PM

WTC: HEALTH EFFECTS AND COMPENSATION

125

provisions contained in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”).309 Count Three alleged a
mandamus claim against EPA related to Count Two, and Count
Four alleged a citizen suit claim against the EPA under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).310
Individual defendants moved to dismiss Count One for
plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.311 The EPA moved to dismiss Counts Two, Three, and
Four for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.312
Count One. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly provide
for a right of redress for a violation by a federal officer acting under
color of authority which deprives an individual of a constitutional
right.313 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, the
Supreme Court created a substantive due process right for damages
against federal officers for violating an individual’s constitutional
rights. 314 In Rochin v. California, the Supreme Court found that
substantive due process encompasses an individual’s right to
bodily integrity free from unjustifiable governmental
interference.315
Even though the Supreme Court has recognized a substantive
due process right to bodily integrity, the Court made clear in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services that “as a
general matter . . . a state’s failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due

309

First Amended Class Action Complaint, Benzman v. Whitman, No.
04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006).
310
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1986). The citizen suit provision of CERCLA
permits citizens to sue on their own behalf when, after giving notice, the
government has failed to take actions to correct certain environmental harms.
311
FED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6).
312
FED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1).
313
See Benzman, 2006 WL 250527, at *12.
314
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
315
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Process Clause.”316 DeShaney provided two exceptions,
however.317 The first exception occurs when a “special
relationship” exists between the state and the individual who claims
protection such as when the state has custody of a prisoner.318 The
second exception—the “state-created danger” exception—exists
when a state official takes an affirmative role either in creating the
danger or in making the plaintiff more vulnerable to the danger.319
However, actions of the state officials under the “state-created
danger” exception must “shock the conscience.”320
The constitutional right that the Benzman plaintiffs asserted
had been violated was their “substantive due process rights to
bodily integrity, and more specifically their right to be free of
official government policies that increase the risk of bodily
harm[.]”321 Plaintiffs’ claimed that defendants violated those
constitutional rights when the defendants released statements in the
days after the WTC attacks.322
The defendants argued: (1) no substantive due process right
existed based on the facts of the case; (2) the “state-created danger”
doctrine was clearly misapplied by the plaintiffs; (3) the asserted
constitutional right was so infirm that it’s existence did not
preclude a qualified immunity defense; and (4) even if a
constitutional right was found to be clearly established, the actions
of the EPA officials did not “shock the conscience.”323 Based on
these arguments, the defendants motioned the court for a dismissal
of the case.324
Relying on a number of Circuit Courts’ opinions, the court
found that the state-created danger doctrine was applicable “where
316
317
318
319

489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 201. See also Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.

1993).
320

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998).
Benzman v. Whitman, No.04-Civ.1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006).
322
Id. at *6, 17.
323
Id. at *14.
324
Id.
321
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the government affirmatively acts to increase the threat to an
individual of third-party private harm,”325 so long as a plaintiff can
provide evidence that “a state officer’s conduct places a person in
peril in deliberate indifference to their safety,”326 and a person is
harmed by police officers agreeing to “stand by” rather than
protect a citizen from harm by third parties.327
In deciding on the dismissal motion and considering the facts in
a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court then examined
whether the defendants had merely failed to act or whether they
had in some way assisted “in creating or increasing the danger” to
the plaintiffs by affirmative acts. 328 The court found no shortage of
affirmative acts by defendant Whitman: (1) making affirmative
statements that the EPA would clean up building interiors to an
acceptable level of safety, but failed to do so, and allowing
residents, office workers, firefighters and school children to return
to contaminated buildings on September 17, 2001; (2) knowingly
disseminating false statements to victims of the attacks regarding
the air quality; (3) delegating the task of cleaning indoor residences,
schools, and commercial office buildings to entities other than the
federal government; (4) endorsing and disseminating NYC’s grossly
improper cleaning instructions; and (5) failing generally to ensure a
clean-up of the WTC impact area and decontamination of buildings
containing cancer-causing agents and other hazardous substances.329
The court concluded that like the police officers in Dwares v.
City of New York, Whitman had taken affirmative acts that
increased the danger to the plaintiffs from the WTC disaster. The
court was emphatic about the defendants’ actions that it found
particularly actionable.330
It is at this point, when the harmful emissions created a

325

Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 287 (1st Cir. 2004).
Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1997).
327
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993).
328
Benzman, 2006 WL 250527, at *15 (quoting Dwares, 985 F.2d at 94).
329
Id. at *19 (finding that the actions alleged were not attributable to
defendant former EPA Assistant Administrator Horinko individually, the Court
dismissed Count One against her).
330
Id. at *20.
326
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danger to the public that Whitman, knowing the likely harm
to those exposed to the hazardous materials, encouraged
residents, workers and students to return to the area. By
these actions, she increased, and may have in fact created,
the danger to Plaintiffs, namely harm to their persons
through exposure to the hazardous substances in the air
after the WTC collapse. Without doubt, if Plaintiffs had not
been told by the head of a federal agency entrusted with
monitoring the environment that it was safe, plaintiffs
would not have so readily returned to the area so soon after
the attacks.331
The court then turned to Whitman’s defense of qualified
immunity but found that the defense was not available to the
defendants because “[n]o reasonable person would have thought
that telling thousands of people that it was safe to return to Lower
Manhattan, while knowing that such return could pose long-term
health risks and other dire consequences, was conduct sanctioned
by our laws.”332 To this end, the court decided that “Defendant
Whitman is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity” on a
motion to dismiss. 333 Defendant Whitman has filed an interlocutory
appeal of this decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
the appeal is pending.334
Counts Two, Three and Four. The court retained Count Two
but dismissed Counts Three and Four against the EPA. The EPA
has appealed to the Second Circuit and the Appeal is pending.335
3. Attempt to Intervene in Benzman v. Whitman
In February of 2006, a group of WTC recovery and cleanup
workers—part of the group of thousands of plaintiffs of In re
331

Id. at *19 (emphasis in original).
Id.
333
Id. at *20.
334
Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-Civ.1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006) (Defs.’ Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, March 8,
2006).
335
Id. (Defs.’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay
Proceedings and Incorporated Mem. of Law, March 9, 2006).
332
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World Trade Center Site Litigation—filed a motion to intervene in
the EPA litigation.336
On October 20, 2006, their motion to intervene was denied by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York337 on
the grounds that, to the extent the putative intervenors have an
interest in this case, that interest is adequately protected by the
plaintiffs. 338
Subsequently, in a motion for reconsideration, petitioners
asserted that the court was incorrect in its previous order when it
dismissed their claims for medical monitoring. Petitioners added
new arguments challenging the adequacy of the plaintiffs’
protection of their interests. 339 In a December 15, 2006
memorandum and order, the court found unpersuasive the putative
intervenors’ new reasons for why they should intervene and thus
denied their motion to reconsider.340 Putative intervenors filed an
appeal to the U.S. Appeals Court for the Second Circuit but
voluntarily withdrew their appeal without prejudice.341
4. Lombardi v. Whitman342
A third law suit was filed by five WTC responders who
performed search, rescue, and cleanup work against a group of
federal government officials, including a former EPA Administrator
and a former Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational

336

Id. (Mem. of Law in Support of Claimants’ Mot. To Intervene, Feb. 21,

2006).
337

Id. (Order, Oct. 20, 2006).
Id.
339
Mot. for Reconsideration, Benzman v. Whitman, 2006 WL 3879748
(Nov. 6, 2006).
340
Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 3771014
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006) (memorandum and order denying motion to
reconsider the court’s October 20, 2006 order denying leave to intervene).
341
Notice of Appeal from October 20, 2006 Order, Benzman v. Whitman,
No. 04 Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 3771014 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006).
342
Lombardi v. Whitman, No.-04-CV-9272, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4464
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2006) aff’d, 485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
338
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).343 In Lombardi v.
Whitman, the plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Benzman, sought a
Bivens constitutional tort remedy. 344 They alleged the defendants
knowingly made false reassurances that the air in NYC after the
WTC disaster was safe to breathe, that such reassurances were the
proximate cause of their injury, and that that the defendants’
conduct violated their right to substantive due process. 345
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the case was heard by
Judge Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.346 In support of this motion, the defendants
argued that, at the time of the WTC disaster response, the named
plaintiffs were NYC, NYS, or federal government employees, and
therefore, workers’ compensation laws or federal immunities bar
their suits.347 Furthermore, the defendants rejected the plaintiffs’
assertion that a constitutional tort remedy existed and, like in
Benzman, argued that even if the court held that such a claim was
valid, the defendants would be entitled to a qualified immunity
defense.348
On February 3, 2007, the court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim.349 The court found
unpersuasive the plaintiffs’ argument that a clearly established
constitutional right had been violated and noted that Bivens and its
progeny concern police misconduct, false arrest, improper searches
and seizures, and freedom of speech fact violations.350 The court
found the Bivens cases were not equivalent to a claim seeking
343

Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 84–85.
345
Id. at 76.
346
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Lombardi v.
Whitman, No. 04-CV-9272, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4464 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3,
2006), aff’d, 485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
347
Id.
348
Id.
349
Summary Order, Lombardi v. Whitman, No. 06-CV-9272, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4464 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2007).
350
Philip E. Kamel & Peter R. Paden, Public Liability for Catastrophic
Events, N.Y.L.J. 3, 6 (2006) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Sept. 11
Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 100, February 2, 2006 ( “Tr.”))[sic].
344
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damages from a former EPA administrator: “[T]here is no clear
statement that anyone has told me about nor I recognize myself
that a constitutional right was being violated when Administrator
Whitman issued the statement that she issued, regardless of
whether it was true or not true.”351 The court saw an ordinary tort
for which the government had not waived its immunity under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, and therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was
not actionable.352
In explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the
“administration had to deal with a situation of concern, of fear [for]
safety, of a need to get on with [the] work of the community, to
avoid an economic catastrophe as well as a physical catastrophe to
the City of New York, and what was said was said.”353 The
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.354
On April 19, 2007, a three judge panel of the Second Circuit
unanimously affirmed the District Court’s dismissal.355 In an
opinion written by Chief Judge Jacobs, the court held that
“because the conduct at issue here does not shock the conscience,
there was no constitutional violation.”356
In an ominous sign for future appellate review of the Benzman
decision, the court took issue with Benzman’s conclusion that the
reassuring statements made by EPA officials in the same press
releases were conscience-shocking based on the nature of EPA’s
statutory mandate.357 The Second Circuit panel chided the District
351

Id. (quoting Tr. at 38).
Id.
353
Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mot.
To Dismiss Hr’g Tr. at 49, Lombardi v. Whitman, No. 04-CV-9272
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006)).
354
Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 74.
355
Id.
356
Id. at 85.
357
Id. at 84. The court explained:
The EPA is designated as the agency in our country to protect human
health and the environment, and is mandated to work for a cleaner,
healthier environment for the American people. The agency enforces
regulations regarding pollution in our environment and the presence of
toxic and hazardous substances, and has endorsed and promulgated
352
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Court for focusing too narrowly on the EPA “without considering
the other substantial government interests at stake.”358 The court
further noted that government officials and agencies must often
balance risks of harm when they make a policy decision, but that
“a poor choice made by an executive official between or among the
harms risked by the available options is not conscience-shocking
merely because for some persons it resulted in grave consequences
that a correct decision could have avoided.”359 Understanding that
government officials might “default to silence in the face of the
public’s urgent need for information” if they knew they would face
a lawsuit for disseminating inaccurate information, the court opined
that “when great harm is likely to befall someone no matter what a
government official does, the allocation of risk may be a burden on
the conscience of the one who must make such decisions, but does
not shock the contemporary conscience.”360
CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center triggered
unprecedented responses on the part of government and the private
sector. Together with the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations
that began on September 11, 2001, efforts aimed at compensating
victims of the attacks through insurance, charitable giving and
government aid also got underway almost immediately after the
attacks.361 Later, many disaster rescue, recovery, and cleanup
responders filed tort claims, some of which are still in litigation.362
Nearly seven years after the terrorist attacks, some
regulations for hazardous and toxic materials, such as asbestos and lead.
As head of the EPA, Whitman knew of this mandate and took part in
and directed the regulatory activities of the agency. Given this
responsibility, the allegations in this case of Whitman’s reassuring and
misleading statements of safety after the September 11, 2001 attacks are
without question conscience-shocking. Id.
358
359
360
361
362

Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2007).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.D.
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firefighters,363 other disaster responders and volunteers,364 and
some occupants of nearby residences, commercial buildings, and
schools have developed symptoms from their World Trade Center
exposures.365 Medical evidence indicates an elevated prevalence of
aerodigestive and mental health problems in some members of these
populations exposed to debris, dust and smoke from the World
Trade Center.366 Medical monitoring of all exposed populations,
together with the medical treatment for those whose illnesses can
be qualitatively linked to their World Trade Center exposures, is
necessary to determine the true, long term health effects resulting
from the WTC disaster and to provide compassionate care for
those who still suffer ill health from the WTC disaster.
Compensation mechanisms that were employed in the weeks
and months following the terrorist attacks—insurance, charitable
giving, and government aid—were an important way to make
victims whole again and should receive serious study and
evaluation as models for handling future terrorist events. The role
of tort remedies in the September 11, 2001 terrorist disaster
remains uncertain, but that role should also be subject to evaluation
as it comes into better focus. Scholarly study and evaluation of the
medical and legal ramifications of the World Trade Center disaster
is as important as our current federal, state, and municipal efforts
to prepare for and respond to another terrorist attack.

363
364
365
366

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
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